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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 3 IBEW
Case #1330000127-00
-andABC, INC
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discharge of NICHOLAS T.
DEMAKAKOS for just cause?
If not,
what she 11 be the remedy?
Hearings were held on June 6th and June 13th, 2000 at
which

time

"grievant"

Mr.
and

Demakakos,

hereinafter

representatives

Company appeared.

of

the

referred
above-named

to

as

the

Union

and

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant was discharged "for falsifying time

records, violation of Company policy and...dishonesty and lack of
candor during (the) investigation..."
More specifically, the grievant, with a work shift
from 4:00 P.M. to midnight is charged with leaving work at about
9:30 P.M. on December 1, 1999, without authorization and without
notification to supervision/ falsifying his Work Report for that
shift by recording that he worked from 4:00 P.M. to midnight.

By

falsely asserting that he left due to illness from the reaction
to an insulin injection for his type I diabetes and for his
failure to acknowledge that he left his shift early until
confronted by an investigation of a different event.
The Company characterizes the grievant's offense as a
"theft of time" - i.e., claiming and receiving pay for a period
of time not worked, from 9:30 P.M. when he left to midnight.
The grievant and the Union, on his behalf, claim that
the time worked on the Work Report was not falsified, but rather
filled out pro forma at the beginning of his shift in
anticipation of working the full shift.

But, that the grievant

became unexpectedly ill towards 9:00 P.M. from an insulin
reaction and had to leave.

It is asserted that he told a fellow

employee that he was leaving early because he felt ill from the
insulin reaction and that he was unaware of any requirement to
contact a supervisor (who was not working that shift) in such a
circumstance.

He asserts that when questioned, he readily

admitted that he left his shift early.
Certain facts are not disputed or have been clearly
established.

The grievant is a type I diabet c, requiring

multiple insulin injections daily.

He left his shift at

9:30 P.M. and made no effort to contact an appropriate
supervisor.

His Work Report states that he started work at 4:00

P.M. and finished at midnight.

At no place in the Report is

there an indication that he left early.

There is no dispute over

the stated work assignments he performed while at work.

He was

paid for the full shift, 4:00 P.M. to midnight.
This is a discharge case with the well-settled burden
on the Company to prove the charges against the grievant by clear
and convincing evidence and to show that the offenses committed
warrant summary discharge.
I can understand the Company's disbelief of the
grievant's claim of a diabet ,c reaction, but I cannot conclude
that that disbelief is supported by clear and convincing evidence
of falsification.

The grievant is diabet;::.

Though it is

unclear in the record whether he claimed he became ill from an
injection he took at work about 8:00 P.M. or from an injection
taken at home before coming to work, that possible inconsistency
is not enough to prove clearly and convincingly that his claimed
illness at about 9:00 P.M. was not due to an insulin reaction.
Also, it is unclear in the record what he told a fellow employee
when he left.

He claims he said he was ill due to an insulin

reaction and was leaving.

The Company claims that upon

investigating the event, that employee said that the grievant
said he was leaving work, but "did not recall" if he said
anything about being ill or why.

The employee was not called as

a witness, so that matter remains controverted and inconclusive.

That the grievant was physically able to carry a
computer, or computer parts in and out of the work location,
prior to claiming illness, does not prove convincingly that he
didn't become ill thereafter, especially if it was triggered by
an insulin injection or reaction.
So, while I appreciate the Company's suspicions, I
cannot judge those suspicions to equate to clear and convincing
evidence of "falsification" of the reasons for which the grievant
left work early.
However, the record does show, clearly and
convincingly that the grievant violated Company policy by leaving
work early without authorization and without notification to
supervision.

I reject his assertion that he did not know of any

requirement to notify supervision, and I reject the argument that
because supervision did not work his shift he could not give the
required notification.

I accept the Company's testimony that he

and the other electricians were regularly instructed to notify
supervision.

And I accept the Company's testimony that

supervision was reachable by telephone through the Company
operator (directly or by answering machine) during the grievant's
shift.

Also, the evidence shows that the grievant often left

notes on his Work Report for supervision, including notes related
to time off.

The critical fact is that the grievant did not try

to notify supervision.

And I am satisfied that regardless of how

or why he became ill, he was physically capable of attempting to
reach or notify supervision, and knew how to leave information of
such a circumstance.
With regard to the time recorded on his Work Report,
there is insufficient evidence to show that he did not fill in
"4:00 P.M." and "midnight" at the beginning of his shift in
anticipation of working regularly.

But, that does not excuse him

from the "falsification" and dishonesty charges, because of
subsequent events.

I conclude that upon leaving his shift early,

or certainly shortly thereafter he had a duty to correct his Work
Report and to see to it that the hours of 4:00 P.M. to midnight
were changed to 4:00 P.M. to 9:30 P.M.

To acknowledge the

wrongness of the time only after an investigation revealed what
he had done, was, to my mind, an effort to hide his early
departure and to accept pay for the entire shift.
So, in that regard, he permitted a time recording,
which may have been originally recorded innocently, to become a
falsification and a dishonest entry.
With regard to the charge "lack of candor," I am not
persuaded that that charge has been proven, nor am I clear as to
what it relates.

If it relates to the Company's position that he

falsified the diabetes reaction, I have previously decided that.
Otherwise, he did not deny that he left work early.

He did not

deny that the Work Report was filled out showing 4:00 P.M. to

midnight.

He did not deny that he did not notify or try to

notify supervision.

He admitted these things when so confronted,

albeit only after an investigation.

In short, it is not that he

"lacked candor" but rather delayed in acknowledging what he did.
This matter, therefore, narrows to whether the penalty
of summary dismissal was appropriate for these offenses by the
grievant.

Traditionally, in labor relations and arbitration law,

leaving a work place or work shift early or without authorization
is a disciplinary offense, but for a first offense, summary
discharge is too severe.

As far as evidence in this case is

concerned, the grievant has no prior disciplinary record.

So, I

would not uphold his discharge for leaving work early, though
some disciplinary penalty is proper.
But "falsification" of a work record is a serious
charge, which if proven, is a summary dismissal offense.

The

well-settled exception is where, by practice an employer has not
imposed the penalty of summary dismissal for that offense on
other employees similarly situated to the employee charged.
Thus, if others, who committed offenses similar to those for
which the grievant is charged were disciplined by lesser
penalties than discharge, or were accorded progressive
disciplines before discharge, the summary discharge of the
grievant for a first offense would be disparate treatment and
reversible.

The record is sparce on what the Company's practice
has been.

The Company's testimony is that other employees who

"stole time" or falsified reports were summarily fired.

The

Company made reference to an "engineer" who was not otherwise
identified and to a "Martin Hermathon(?)."

There was no

testimony on the details of their offenses or anything else about
them.

So, I am unable to accept these references as either

precedential or as a practice.
However, one other employee was identified, namely Jan
Thomas, also an electrician like the grievant, who also left work
early (at 10:00 P.M.) on December 1st and who also was discharged
for doing so.
The Thomas disciplinary record is relevant to this
case.
Before being discharged, Thomas was progressively
disciplined three times, in 1987, 1993 and 1997 for offenses
similar to the charges against the grievant.

In 1987, he

received a warning for "le(aving) the building for personal
reasons," for "being late on several occasions and not calling..."
In 1993, he was again warned for "le(aving) your
assigned area one half hour before normal quitting time," which
the Company defined in the warning as "theft of service."
And in 1997, he was suspended for one day for "not
reporting to work...as scheduled" after "advis(ing) the Company

that you were going to be a few minutes late."

Also,

significantly, the warning and suspension was for
"misrepresent (ing) the facts for not reporting to work..." by
stating that "you had a car accident and got locked up all
night."

It goes on to state that Thomas "admit(ted) you were not

locked up...and thus...offered two separate accounts as to why you
failed to appear for work or call in to advise us of this
absence."
In sum, for failure to report for work, for falsifying
the reasons for not doing so and for "theft of services" Thomas
was progressively warned and suspended a day.
It is obvious to me that these three prior
disciplinary actions constituted a "progressive discipline"
sequence, which led to Thomas' discharge after he, like the
grievant, left his shift early without permission on December
1st.

And I am constrained to deem the Company's action regarding

Thomas as constituting a "practice," at least within the
evidentiary nature of this arbitration case.
To my mind, and consistent with the well-established
principle that employees similarly situated should not be
disciplined differently, I see the grievant and Thomas to be
similarly situated in several relevant respects.

The grievant left his work place without permission,
and so did Thomas.

The grievant is charged with "theft of time -

-- Thomas with "theft of service."

During an investigation, the

grievant is charged with giving a false reason for leaving work.
Thomas lied about the reason for his absence from work during an
investigation of his absence.
ultimately told the truth.

The Company says that Thomas

But, as I have ruled, the Company has

not proved that the grievant's explanation was not true or not
worthy of, as it did with Thomas, "taking his word for it."
The Company claims a significant difference between
Thomas and the grievant, namely their respective periods of
employment with the Company.

Thomas had 15 years of service when

discharged, the grievant, 27 months.
The Company's "distinction" is classical "boot
trapping."

It explains that Thomas was accorded the "progressive

disciplines" of warnings and a suspension before discharge
because he was a long-service employee of 15 years.

But,

obviously, when Thomas was warned in 1987 for leaving work
improperly he had been employed about two years.
And when he was charged with "theft of service" in
1993, and again warned, his seniority was not yet the 15 years
the Company now relies on in justifying the difference between
Thomas and the grievant.

Nor had it gotten to that point in

1997, when he was warned and suspended for absence from work and
falsification of the reasons for that absence.
This is not to say that the formula applied to Thomas
should be precisely applied to the grievant.
Rather it is to say that considering my findings
regarding the charges against the grievant against the back drop
of-how similar charges were handled by the Company for Thomas,
the penalty of summary dismissal imposed on the grievant is
disparate, and therefore, too severe.
However, the modest penalties imposed on Thomas are
not appropriate either, because I think they were less than
warranted and because the grievant is responsible for one offense
arguably different than those committed by Thomas.

That offense,

as I found, is his failure to correct his time record on his
Daily Work Report, and his apparent expectation to be paid for
the entire shift when he knew that he did not work the
approximately last 2 ^ hours of that shift.
Considering the charges upheld and those not
sustained; the similarities between Thomas and the grievant and
the respective penalties imposed I conclude that this latter
offense by the grievant, though serious, falls short of "cause"
for his discharge.

(I note that in 1993, Thomas was "docked" pay

for the time he took off.

The Company could have and may "dock"

the grievant similarly, and I shall make that part of my AWARD).

10

On the other hand, having rejected discharge, it is in my
authority to fashion a remedy (or penalty) de novo, that I
consider appropriate to the offense.

Overall, I conclude that

the proper and appropriate penalty is a suspension for the period
the grievant has been out.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of NICHOLAS T. DEMAKAKOS is
reduced to a disciplinary suspension.

He

shall be reinstated, but without back pay.
The period of time from his discharge to his
reinstatement shall be the period of the
suspension.
The Company may recoup from DEMAKAKOS money
paid to him for time he did not work on
December 1, 1999.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

June 26, 2000

STATE OF NEW YORK
ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of the Arbitration Between

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK,

SED FILE NO. 3,746

Complainant,
-and -

OPINION AND AWARD

ELIZABETH W. WITTER,
Respondent.

A proceeding pursuant to Section 3020-a of the Education Law
Hearing Officer: Eric J. Schmertz

Appearances:

For the District:
Chad Vignola, General Counsel to the Chancellor
by Susan Mandel, Esq.
For the Respondent:
James R. Sandner, General Counsel, NYSUT
by {Catherine Levine, Esq.

INTRODUCTION
By written notice dated March 23, 1999, Anthony Amato, Superintendent of
Community School District Six (District), preferred charges pursuant to §3020-a of the
Education Law against Elizabeth W. Witter (Respondent), a tenured teacher assigned to
P.S. 528 in Manhattan.
The Undersigned was appointed to serve as the Hearing Officer by notice dated
May 14, 1999. A pre-hearing conference was held on June 4, 1999. By party agreement,
hearings were held on September 23, 1999, October 13, 1999, November 3, 1999,
December 13, 1999, January 31, 2000, March 16, 2000, April 3 and 14, 2000, and May
24, 2000. All proceedings were transcribed. Both parties were afforded a full
opportunity to examine witnesses and to present evidence and argument in support of
their positions. There were no objections to the conduct of the hearing. Counsel for the
parties gave oral summations and arguments in lieu of written memoranda on July 6,
2000. The record was closed as of August 18, 2000 upon my receipt of the transcript of
the July 6 proceeding.
THE CHARGES
Elizabeth Witter, (hereinafter referred to as Respondent), is a tenured
teacher assigned to P.S. 528 in Manhattan. Respondent acted
improperly during the 1997-1998 school year, using offensive
language, despite prior notice received that she was not to use coarse
language.
In Particular:
SPECIFICATION I: Respondent utilized offensive language and
acted in a way which was substantial cause that rendered her unfit to

perform her duties to the service, and which was just cause for
discipline under §3020-a of the Education Law, in that:
A) On or about September 30, 1997 Respondent called student F.V.
dumb and a dummy.
B) On or about October 23, 1997 Respondent threatened to throw
student E.P. out of the window.
C) On or about October 23, 1997 student S.M. stated to Respondent
words to the effect of "You treat us like this because we are from
another country." Respondent answered with words to the effect of
"So what if I am, what are you going to do?"
D) In November 1997 of Respondent said words to the effect of "I
am not going to take this shit from parents. They come then they say
I have an attitude. I am not going to take this bullshit."
E) On or about December 8, 1997 Respondent
1. referred to student S.M. in class, with words to the effect of
. "Come, look at this chipmunk coming to cause trouble" and
2. called student S.M. stupid and a dummy.
F) On December 8, 1997 Respondent told student V.R. words to the
effect that he was full of shit.
G) On or about December 8, 1997 Respondent said to student S.M.
words to the effect of:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

"I am sick of you."
"God gave a better brain to a goat than to you."
"I wish you would just shut up."
"I am going to fail your ass."
"You should shut your mouth so you can listen."
"I want your ass out of here."

H) Respondent told student E.P. words to the effect of to "get out
of that window before I throw you out that window."
I) Respondent, at times, called her class:
1. Dummies;
2. Idiots; and
3. Ding-bats.
J) Respondent utilized curse words in class such as:
1. Shit;
2. Bitch;

3.
4.
5.
6.

Dummy;
Stupid;
Suckers; and
Ding-bats.

K) Respondent told class she was prejudiced against Dominicans.
L) Respondent told a student in the class to urinate on herself.
M) Respondent used the word "shit" when banging on her desk in
class on at least one occasion.
N) Respondent called student E a bum and a sucker.
O) Respondent told the class on at least one occasion words to the
effect of that she is tired of Puerto Rican and Dominican people.
P) Respondent told the class on at least one occasion that she is
sick of these fucking children.
Q) Respondent told the class on one occasion with the words to
the.effect of:
1. "I am not wearing any panties."; and
2. "Do not look up my skirt."
R) On at least one occasion Respondent.
1. spit on student F's head; and
2. answered no after he asked to use the restroom.
S) Respondent stuck out her middle finger at a student in a vulgar
gesture on at least one occasion.
SPECIFICATION II: Respondent inflicted corporal punishment
and emotional distress on students during the 1997-1998 school
year as follows:
A) On or about October 23, 1997 Respondent refused to allow
student S to use the restroom.
B) Respondent refused to allow student F.S. to go to the
bathroom, when he desperately had to go to the bathroom.
C) On or about December 10, 1997 Respondent pushed student
V.R..
D) Respondent struck various students in the class.
E) Respondent slammed a locker door on student X.R.'s finger.

F) Respondent told students in the class words to the effect of
ushit on yourselves" when students asked to use the restroom.
The foregoing constitutes
- Offensive speech;
- Corporal punishment under article 10.4 of the
by-laws of the Board of Education.
- Neglect of duty;
- Insubordination;
- Conduct unbecoming her position and conduct
prejudicial to the good order, efficiency and
discipline of the service;
- Substantial cause that renders the employee
unfit to properly perform her obligations under
the service; and
- Just cause for discipline under section 3020-a
of the Education Law.

The District seeks to have the Respondent terminated from service.
The Respondent denies all of the allegations and seeks dismissal of all charges.

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

District
A preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that the Respondent lost
control of her classroom early in the 1997-98 school year. Frustrated by her inability to
maintain discipline in her classroom, the Respondent subjected many of her students to
months and months of egregious verbal abuse and, sometimes, physical abuse. Her open
hostility towards her students damaged them emotionally and created a "horrible"
classroom experience for them, which undermined their education. Any misconduct by

any of the Respondent's students or any disrespect they showed toward the Respondent
cannot justify or excuse her abuse of them. There being no indication that the
Respondent can improve her attitude or performance, she should be terminated from
service.
Respondent
The District has not proven any of the allegations against the Respondent by a
preponderance of the credible evidence. There is, indeed, no evidence or no competent
evidence in support of several of the specifications which must be dismissed. The
students who testified against the Respondent at the hearing should not be credited. At
least six street-wise "problem" students, who did not like the Respondent because she
was strict with them, conspired to "get" the Respondent and to cause her to be fired by
making allegations that are either untrue or significantly exaggerated. To whatever
extent the Respondent may be found to have said or done anything of which she is
accused, her remarks and conduct were provoked by students who greatly abused and
disrespected her. Respondent's actions are not of a type to warrant any severe penalty
and certainly not termination from service.
RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS
The Respondent filed a pre-hearing motion to dismiss the charges on the ground
that the charges as filed were not specific enough to permit an adequate defense. That
motion was expressly made subject to Respondent's separate demand for a bill of
particulars and for the production of documents. These motions were discussed at the

June 4, 1999 pre-hearing conference. By the date of the conference, certain documents
had already been provided to the Respondent. As a result of the conference, additional
documents were either produced voluntarily by the District or pursuant to my order.
Counsel for Respondent thereupon held the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending
document production. That pre-hearing motion not having been renewed, it is deemed
moot and withdrawn.
A separate motion to dismiss certain specifications of the charges was made
during the hearing on the ground of an alleged failure or inadequacy of proof. Counsel
for the Respondent argues that specifications which are not supported by the testimony of
the students to whom the statements were allegedly made or against whom the actions
were taken must be dismissed because the Respondent is entitled to confront each of her
accusers directly. Moreover, the students' personal testimony is allegedly needed so that
the degree to which, if any, they were traumatized by the statements alleged to have been
made by the Respondent can be assessed for purposes of determining penalty, as may be
found to be appropriate.
After the close of the District's case, counsel for the Respondent again moved to
dismiss several of the specifications and to strike parts of certain District exhibits. The
parts of those exhibits to which the motion to strike is made are those consisting of
written statements made by the school principal and an investigator for the District in
which they summarize their interviews with certain of the students in Respondent's class.
Counsel for the Respondent argues that evidence from persons who did not hear

Respondent's alleged comments or observe her actions should not be admitted to
establish her guilt.
The District concedes that specifications of the charges for which there is no
evidence or insufficient evidence must be dismissed. It disagrees, however, that the
specifications of the charges can only be proven by the testimony of the students to
whom the comments were made or those who were the recipients of any alleged physical
contact with the Respondent. The District argues, for example, that if comments were
made by a teacher to one student, or if actions were taken against one student, but that
comment was overheard or that action was observed by a different student, the testimony
of that second student should be considered even if the first student, for whatever reason,
does not testify.
In support of the motions, Counsel for the Respondent relies upon awards by
Hearing Officer Rinaldo (SED #3 508)and Hearing Officer Dorsey (SED #3406). In each
case, the disciplinary charges were dismissed for failure of proof. In both, the only
evidence offered was by third parties who had no first-hand evidence to offer based on
personal observation of the acts constituting the basis for the charges.
Those two awards are distinguishable from the circumstances of this case. As the
District points out, there is testimony in this case from individuals who personally
witnessed the alleged statements and behaviors of the Respondent. The testimony of
personal observers to an event is competent evidence. The credibility of those witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony for purposes of assessing guilt and/or penalty
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are, however, issues separate from the alleged incompetency of the evidence itself, a
distinction I have recognized and applied in my analysis of the evidence.
The testimony of persons who interviewed the students is also competent
evidence, but its value is limited. They were not personal observers to the events.
Therefore, their testimony and the documents they prepared cannot establish the truth of
the proposition they recorded, which they did not observe. The consistency of a person's
recollection of an event over time, however, is a factor to be considered in assessing that
person's credibility as a witness. With consistency, there is room for an argument that
they are more credible witnesses than they might be if there were not that consistency.
Consistency is not a dispositive factor in assessing a witness' credibility, but neither is
evidence of that consistency incompetent and inadmissible. Therefore, to the extent the
pre-hearing statements of the students to third parties is consistent with the testimony
those students offered during the heaiings, that evidence is relevant and probative on the
issue of witness credibility.
For these reasons, the motion to strike the exhibits is denied. The motion to
dismiss charges at the outset is denied except insofar as there is no record evidence at all
regarding a specification or only incompetent evidence. Having reviewed the record, I
find that the following specifications of the charges are either wholly unsupported by any
evidence in the record or are not supported by any competent evidence:
I(A); I(S); II(A) and II(F).
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For the reasons discussed hereafter, the motion to dismiss is granted as to those
enumerated specifications. The discussion of and the rulings on all specifications
follow.
The District's case was presented under testimony by six of Respondent's sixth
grade students: F.C.; J.C.; S.M.; X.R., E.P. and S.T.; testimony by Principal of P.S. 528,
Martha Madera and by Raymond Garcia, a Confidential Investigator for the District's
Office of Special Investigation. Madera and Garcia had taken statements from certain of
Respondent's students, but as stated previously neither had any first-hand knowledge
regarding Respondent's alleged statements.
The following is a summary of the students' testimony at the hearing regarding
Respondent's alleged statements and actions.
F.C.

Respondent called him a "dummy" in the fall of 1997 when he was being
inattentive in class and couldn't answer questions. Respondent told E.P., who had been
talking in class, and was then near a window getting a pencil, to "get off the window
before I throw you out the window." Respondent called him "dumb," "dummy," and
"idiot" if he took time to answer a question.
S.M. once asked the Respondent why she treated the class "that way". In response
to S.M.'s asking Respondent whether it was "because we're Dominican", Respondent
said "Yes, I treat you like that. What are you going to do about it?" This was the only
reference to "Dominicans" that F.C. could recall Respondent making, but F.C. admitted
that he was not certain about Respondent's response to S.M.'s question. After an
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argument with S.M., Respondent hit S.M. with a phone on his head. Respondent also
denied S.M. the use of the bathroom and called S.M. a "chipmunk only coming to school
for trouble." Respondent called S.M. a "dingbat" and "sucker." When R.G. asked to use
the bathroom one day, Respondent refused her request and said R.G. could "pee on
herself if she had to." F.C. admitted, however, that he was "very unsure" about this
comment to RG. Respondent denied F.S. the use of the bathroom and told her to "stay
shut" meaning "be quiet." Respondent on an unknown date told the class that she was
not wearing "drawers and don't look under my skirt." Respondent cursed in class and
F.C. thinks the Respondent would say "shit."
J.C.

Respondent always screamed at F.C. and called him names such as "stupid" and
"dummy" when F.C. was bothering the class. He was told that Respondent spit on E.P.'s
head, but he did not see it. Respondent would call S.M.'s parents and S.M. would cry as
a result because he was embarrassed. Respondent called S.M. "stupid" after S.M. had
complained to the principal about Respondent. Respondent told unnamed students who
were playing with the class computer after they had been told not to continue play that
she would "throw them out the window." Respondent told the class that she is "racist"
and "hates Dominicans" after S.M. asked her why she was "like this to Dominicans."
Respondent hit S.M. on the head with a phone. J.C. does not remember Respondent
cursing. S.M. "might" have called Respondent a "black bitch." Respondent once
referred to students as "stupid Dominicans." F.C. called Respondent an "African booty
scratcher" and that was when Respondent said she "hates Dominicans." Respondent
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called F.C. "stupid" on an unknown date when he was running around the classroom
"bothering" students. Respondent called V.R. "stupid" after he had been involved in a
fight. Respondent told S.M. that she "hates" him. Respondent told R.G. to "pee" on
herself after she asked to go to the bathroom in the middle of a lesson. R.G. had asked to
use the bathroom "a lot" that day. R.G. was crying at the time.
S.M.
Respondent called him "dingbat." Respondent would curse out loud in class when
she banged her desk. Respondent called students "bad" names. Respondent told E.P. in
the Spring of 1998 that she would "throw him out the window" when he was looking for
his pencil. When a student asked Respondent if she was a racist, she said, "I'm a racist
against Dominicans." S.M. believed it was V who asked Respondent that question.
Respondent, on an unknown date, told V.R. he was "full of shit" after he was arguing
with Respondent. Respondent called him a "chipmunk who makes trouble." Respondent
would not let students use the bathroom and sometimes said, "hell no' when they asked.
Respondent hit him with a phone, but he didn't know whether it was an accident and he
was not in pain. Respondent sometimes said "shit" out loud. When his father came to
class, Respondent said, "I'm not taking this shit from parents" after his father left.
X.R.

Respondent called S.M. a "dingbat." Respondent said "shit" and "stupid" when
she banged on the table when she taught him in fifth grade. Respondent told E.P. she
would "throw him out the window" when he was behaving badly. Respondent hit S.M.
by accident and called him "stupid". He was told Respondent hit E in the forehead but he
did not see it. Respondent pushed V.R., but he did not observe that either. Respondent
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said to S.M. that she is "racist of Dominicans." Respondent told R.G. that she could
"pee" on herself when she was misbehaving. S.M. called Respondent a "nigger" and
would sing that word in class. Respondent said that she "did not like Dominicans" after
S.M. cursed at her. Respondent called X.R. a "dingbat" and "lazy." Respondent banged
his finger in a locker, but he was uncertain as to whether it was done on purpose or
accidentally.
E.P.
Respondent calls everybody "dingbats" and "dummies" every day. Respondent hit
S.M. in the forehead with a cell phone on purpose. After S.M. asked why she "does
this," Respondent said that she "doesn't like Dominicans and Puerto Ricans."
Respondent called S.M. a "dumb ass." Respondent pushed V.R.. Respondent spit on
E.P. when he asked to use the bathroom. E.P. thereafter transferred from Respondent's
class. Respondent deliberately kicked a locker door shut on X.R.'s finger. Respondent
told him she would throw him out the window and that his mother is "stupid."
S.T.
Respondent "cursed" in class and called students "stupid". Respondent accused
him of looking up her skirt and she said that she was not wearing underwear. Respondent
would allow only some students to use the bathroom. When S.M. was hit with the door
enclosing a classroom telephone mounted to the wall, it may have been an accident.

hi addition to S.M.'s testimony, the District introduced into evidence three sets of
handwritten notes taken by S.M. of comments allegedly made by Respondent. These
notes, according to S.M., were taken at the request of Principal Madera and most of these
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notes were written by S.M. at the same time or soon after Respondent allegedly made the
comments recorded in the notes. The following are the comments recorded by S.M. in
his notes.
When E.P. was looking for a pencil, Respondent told him to "get up and go to the
wall." When E.P. went to the window, Respondent told him to "get out of that window
before I throw you out." Respondent called the students in the back of the room
"dummies, idiots and dingbats." Respondent told S.M. during a reading lesson that she
"didn't want to hear any garbage." Respondent sometimes uses "bad words at us."
When S.M.'s father left class after arguing with the Respondent, the Respondent "started
to say" "I'm not going to take this shit from parents. They come then they say I have an
attitude. I am not going to take this bullshit." Respondent called S.M. "dummy" and
"stupid" on December 8, 1997. When S.M. and V.R. came to class on December 8, 1997,
Respondent said "look at them chipmunks coming to cause trouble." On December 8,
1997, Respondent told V.R. he was "full of shit." On December 8, 1997, Respondent
called F "stupid" and S.M. "dummy." On December 10, 1997, S.M. writes that
Respondent said to him: "God gave a brain better than a goat for you"; "I wish you
would just shut up"; "dummie"; "I'll fail (your) ass." On December 1997, S.M. writes
that Respondent tells him: "shut [his] mouth".. ."I could listen.. .shit"1; "I want your ass
out of here."
S.M.'s notes are the only ones taken by a student reflecting comments allegedly
made by Respondent. The District also introduced written statements made by Principal
This comment was not clearlv written in S.M.'s notes.
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Madera. Michelle Cambrier, a Staff Developer, and Raymond Garcia of comments made
to them by students in Respondent's class about statements Respondent allegedly made to
the students or things she allegedly did to them. The events as recorded follow next. 1
find that there is no reason in the record to conclude that the comments made were not
accurately recorded. It is also clear, however, that these are not verbatim reports
reflecting everything that was said during the interview.
Madera's Notes
On December 5, 1997, F.S. reports that Respondent "always" called him "stupid"
and "dummy." After F.S. asks whether Respondent doesn't like her students because
they are "from another country," Respondent tells F.S., "Hell yeah. I don't like you." On
December 8, 1997, V.R. reports that Respondent had told him he was "full of shit" and
said "your mother" to him in the past when he disobeyed. On December 10, 1997, V.R.
reports that Respondent had pushed him for talking. S.M. reports that Respondent on
December 10, 1997 called him "stupid" and "dummy" in front of the class and a "punk
that liked to cause trouble." On December 11, 1997, F.C. reports that Respondent
"always calls him 'stupid', 'dummy' and 'idiot'." F.C. reports that he asked Respondent
"why she doesn't like us, is it because we are Dominicans?" to which Respondent
responds, "Hell yes I'm a racist." On December 18, 1997, N.C. reports that Respondent
uses "lots of bad words in class" and calls students "animals" "stupid" "idiots" "suckers"
"asses" "dingbats" and that they are "full of shit." N.C. reports that Respondent tape
records students but turns off ihe recorder when she "curses at them."
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Incident Report
Michelle Cambrier and Principal Madera interviewed several of Respondent's
students on January 11, 1998. In their written report to the Office of Special
Investigations, which was prepared on January 16, 1998 and signed by Cambrier, the
following statements appear. Cambrier did not testify, but Madera did. Although
somewhat unclear from the record, it appears that Madera was present for all of the
interviews.

G.C.
Reports that Respondent asked him when he came late to class, "why are
Dominicans coming late to class all the time?" and then she said, "This is idiotic." When
G.C. asks Respondent why she called him an "idiot," Respondent states, "I am prejudiced
against Dominicans."
M.C.
Reports that Respondent curses when she is angry and says "shit," "bitch" and
"stupid." Respondent called the class the "stupidest class in the school." Respondent
said she is "racist against Dominicans." Respondent told R.G. that R.G. "could not lie
the way she [Respondent] could lie."
F.C.
Respondent "screams at me too much" and "calls names" like "dummy, bums,
suckers stupid." Respondent told students she would "throw us out the window" and that
she is "racist against Dominicans."
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N.C.

Reports that Respondent "screams a lot to the children" and says "stupid" to
students. Respondent stated "take that to the female you came from;" students "have me
sick." After opening the window, Respondent told NC, "1 wish I could throw you out
this window." Respondent hit S.M. "with her hands."
E.D.
Respondent "grabbed" his neck "real hard" and called him and others "stupid" and
him "lazy." She said "fuck" and "other curses." Respondent "hits the children"
including X.R., V.R., E.D. and F.S..
R.G.
Respondent calls students "names" and "bad things" like "crazy," "sick" and
dopes." Respondent said to "urinate on yourself." Respondent "locks you out of the
room.
S.M.
Respondent calls him "dummie" and "stupid". When S.M. and V.R. came to class
"this morning," Respondent said "look at the chipmunks coming in to cause trouble."
"Later on," Respondent told V.R. he was "full of shit," she "just" called F.C. "stupid" and
said she was "sick" of S.M.. Respondent told S.M. "God gave a better brain to a goat
than me" and that she would "tail my ass." Respondent told E.P. to "get out of the
window before I throw you out" after she told him to "get up and go to the wall."
Respondent says "bad things" to students like "dingbats" "dummies" and "idiots."
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E.P.
Respondent told him once that she would "throw him out the window if he did not
move fast." Respondent "always yelled at him" and called him "stupid" and "idiot."
Respondent spit on E.P.'s head when he asked to use the bathroom.
X.R.
Respondent "hit [him] on the head with the paper. Respondent calls the students
"retarded" "dumb" "lazy" and "dingbats" and "yells all the time." Respondent slammed a
locker door on X.R.'s finger during Thanksgiving time after "she got angry.
V.R.
Respondent "screams a lot at [him] and the other boys in the back." Respondent
told him he was "full of shit" and called him a "bum" and "stupid". Respondent told him
she is "racist against Dominicans and Puerto Ricans" and that she was "tired of us and
doesn't want us anymore." Respondent "pushes me" and tells me she will "hit" me.

F.S.
Respondent called him a "bum" and "stupid" and told him she is "racist against
Dominicans and Puerto Ricans." Respondent stated that she is "fucking tired of these
fucking Dominican kids." Respondent denies him use of the bathroom when he
"desperately needs to go."
Garcia's Report
Raymond Garcia's report identifies students by letter of the alphabet, age and
gender. The actual identity of the students was established at the hearing. His report was
prepared in March 1998 from interviews conducted on January 7, 1998. He took
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handwritten notes of the interviews, which he used to prepare his typed report, but he
testified at the hearing that he had lost the handwritten notes and could not produce them.
The interviews were conducted in the presence of another investigator, Anthony DeLeo,
and Principal Madera.
Student A, an 11 year old male (F.S.)
Respondent calls him and other students "stupid", "suckers" and "dummies."
Respondent "screams" when students misbehave and says "shit" when she bangs her
desk. Respondent does not help students when they ask for help.
Student B, an 11 year old male (F.C.)
Respondent calls students ""dummies" and "stupid." Respondent "screams a lot at
the class." Respondent said she is "racist toward Dominicans". Respondent ignored him
when he asked for the homework assignment.
Student C, a 12 year old male (V.R.)
Respondent told him she was "tired of Puerto Rican and Dominican people."
Respondent announced that the "classroom smells like shit." Respondent calls the
students "idiots," "stupid" and "bums." Respondent stated that she was "sick of these
fucking children." Respondent told him he was "full of shit" when he asked to go to the
bathroom and accused "them" of "looking under her dress" and told "them that she was
not wearing any panties."
Student D, an 11 year old female (N.C.)
Respondent calls the students "dummies" "stupid" and "sciearns a lot."
Respondent has told students to "shit on themselves" when they have asked to go to the
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bathroom. Respondent "has said that she is a racist toward Dominicans and Puerto
Ricans.
Student E, an 11 year old male (S.M.)
Respondent called him a "bum" and "sucker." She called him a "dummy" when
he could not clearly read the numbers 8 and 9. Respondent tells students they are
"stupid" and "dummies" when they talk in class. Respondent does not let students use
the bathroom. After Respondent was asked by a students if she was a "racist toward
Dominicans," Respondent replied "Hell, yeah."
Student F, an 11 year old male (E.P.)
Respondent told him to "stand by the window" when he was looking for a pencil
and if he didn't she would "throw him out." After S.M. asked Respondent if she was
"racist," Respondent replied, "If I am, what is it to you?" Respondent spit on his head
when he ask^d to go to the bathroom.
Student G, an 11 year old female (R.G.)
Respondent "screams" and says "shut up" and "shit" in class. Respondent calls
students "stupid" and "dummies" when they misbehave. R.G. reports that she does not
learn in class.
Student H, a 12 year old male (X.R.)
Reports that he does not like Respondent. Respondent calls students "stupid" and
"dummies". Respondent stuck out her middle finger at a student.
Garcia's report also summarizes a meeting he and Supervising Investigator Elaine
Smith had with Respondent and a UFT representative on February 26, 1998. According
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to Garcia, he prepared the report after his meeting with Respondent. His report reflects
that Respondent denied the allegations of verbal abuse and those alleging she used
inappropriate language in the classroom.
Respondent testified in defense of the charges, as did fellow teachers at PS 528,
Barbara List, Lois Roher, Alexander Kramer, and Alberto Fernandez.2 In addition,
counsel for Respondent called Milagros Porras, the mother of A.S., one of Respondent's
sixth-grade students, and A.S. himself.
Porras described Respondent as a "very caring" and "good" teacher. Porras
testified that her son told her that several students in the class drove Respondent "crazy."
A.S. was the only student who testified on behalf of Respondent, who taught him
in fifth and sixth grade. According to A.S., he never heard Respondent say the things she
is accused of saying. A.S. testified, however, that Respondent would say "shit" to herself
if she had an accident. A.S. also testified that he told Principal Madera that Respondent
had done nothing wrong, yet he was not interviewed and his statements were not
recorded. According to A.S., when Respondent told students she would fail them, she
was making a joke and was trying to motivate them to do better.
According to A.S., several students, including S.M., V.R., R.G., F.S. and J.C.
agreed to a "plan" to get Respondent fired because they hated her. According to A.S.,
S.M. said he would "get Respondent back" for calling his parents about his misbehavior
in class and about his "bad marks." A.S. recalled students saying they would blackmail

2

Fernandez replaced Respondent after she was suspended.
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Respondent and he overheard F.S. and S.M. laughing just before Respondent was
removed from the class and saying they "were going to have the last laugh."
Several of the witnesses, including many of the students and the Respondent,
testified about the students' conduct in Respondent's class. In general summary, mere
was a great deal of misbehavior by several of her students and flagrant disrespect of
Respondent by some. There were many examples and descriptions on the record of
which the following are illustrative.
Barbara List, an 18-year teacher who began at P.S. 528 in 1996, testified that
Respondent's class had some very difficult children who were rude and disrespectful at
times.
Lois Roher, also a teacher at P.S. 528, testified that Respondent had an "extremely
difficult" group of five or six students who made her "life very difficult." Among these
students were ones who were "mattentive," who "talked back," and at least one who had
"serious personal problems." Roher described this group as "the most difficult group I've
come across." According to Roher, "nobody" wanted Respondent's job.
hi testimony that counsel for Respondent argues establishes or at least supports a
conclusion that several of Respondent's students conspired and lied to cause Respondent
to be discharged, Roher testified that she saw a group of Respondent's students sitting
with their feet on a table and heard the statement, "we got rid of a teacher."
Alexander Kramer has taught at P.S. 528 since it opened in September 1993. For
a time he was a UFT chapter leader. Kramer testified that several of the students in
Respondent's class were "street-wise" and more sophisticated and manipulative than
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many sixth graders. He recalled some of Respondent's students saying that they did "not
like her." Kramer described some of Respondent's students as "insolent" and he
described one who had a temper and liked to curse and another who acted out and talked
back.
Alberto Fernandez replaced Respondent after she was removed. He testified that
the class was "very disruptive" and "disrespectful." He identified 5 students with
particular behavior problems. He would call their parents and refer them to the social
worker. In his opinion, the class was an "8" on a 10-degree scale of difficulty.
Several of the students who testified admitted that they and others misbehaved in
Respondent's class. F.C. testified that E.P. was talking in class when Respondent said
she would throw him out the window. F.C. described S.M. as a "very poorly behaved
student," who was "bad in class" and "called others names" and "curses." F.C. testified
that a student told him that he did not like Respondent. F.C. admitted that he sometimes
ran around the class and did not pay attention and otherwise misbehaved as did S.M.,
X.R., V.S. and F.
J.C. testified that he is both "bad" and "good" in class and that he did not like
Respondent. S.M. testified that he was "angry" with Respondent because she called his
parents about his behavior and work habits.
Respondent denied unequivocally during her testimony all of the allegations made
against her. She admitted only losing her temper with S.M. once or twice after S.M. had
misbehaved and was disrespectful to her. Respondent admits that she told S.M. to "shut
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up and sit down," but not often. She also acknowledged that she might have banged on
her desk occasionally.
Barbara List testified that she had not heard Respondent make disparaging
remarks about students and that Respondent does not use foul language on a customary
basis. Lois Roher's testimony regarding Respondent's character was similar. Alexander
Kramer testified that Respondent did not scream at her students, was not physical with
them and that she did not make derogatory remarks about them or their nationality.
DISCUSSION
Counsel for the parties are in agreement regarding the well-established burden and
standards of proof. The District has the burden of proving the charges in these
proceedings by a preponderance of the credible evidence.
Corporal punishment has been prohibited by Regulation of the District's
Chancellor since at least 1992. The current regulation is A-420 dated December 8, 1997.
Corporal punishment is defined as any "act of physical force upon a pupil for the purpose
of punishing that pupil" with certain stated exceptions not here relevant (e.g. defense of
self or others, defense of property or student restraint after warning and given the absence
of reasonable alternatives).
The Regulation incorporates the District's Bylaws which prohibits "punishment of
any kind tending to cause excessive fear or physical or mental distress." Expressly
included in the Regulation as a form of corporal punishment in violation of the
Regulation is "language that belittles or subjects students to ridicule or is abusive or
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threatening verbal communication." The type of speech for which Respondent stands
accused fits within that definition of corporal punishment.
By Regulation, the school principal is required to notify all staff members of the
District's policy and rules regarding corporal punishment. Madera testified that the
regulation was distributed to staff. There is no dispute that Respondent in fact knew
about the District's policies regarding corporal punishment and the use of offensive or
inappropriate language.
Offensive language directed to students by a teacher is also a ground for the
imposition of discipline even if it does not rise to the level of corporal punishment.
As an introduction to my specific findings that follow, it is first appropriate to
place this case in general context. As Respondent has unequivocally denied all of the
material allegations made against her, the disposition of these charges as to Respondent's
guilt depends entirely upon an assessment of the credibility of the several witnesses. The
issue becomes whether her denial should be credited, which necessitates a conclusion that
the students who testified against her lied in their testimony before me and in their
statements to school officials which predate their testimony before me.
Counsel for Respondent urges me to discredit the students' testimony because
several of them allegedly conspired together to lie because they wanted Respondent to be
transferred or terminated. The students did not like her because she was strict with them
and had embarrassed one or more of them either by calling their parents or for some other
reason the students found to be offensive.
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An allegation that a teacher is guilty of corporal punishment is by its nature a
serious one because it attacks an employee's character, reputation and employment
opportunities, existing and future. Given the seriousness of these allegations, I have
reviewed the record thoroughly and repeatedly and have considered the witnesses'
demeanor very carefully. Having done so, I find no reason to discredit the students'
testimony for the most part. There is substantial consistency in the witnesses' testimony
and corroboration in their interview statements. There are certain inconsistencies in the
details the students remembered, but that is not surprising if for no other reason than the
students' ages and the lapse of time between the events and the hearing. As to
Respondent's allegations that there was a sweeping conspiracy to lie, it is simply not
reasonable to believe that so many students could get together, concoct an elaborate set of
allegations about remarks Respondent made, some most unusual in their content, plan so
as to make their story consistent, and then stick to their story across time, differing
circumstances and the changing identity of the individuals to whom they reported.
There is, moreover, a clear pattern that emerges that buttresses the students'
version of events. This record reveals that Respondent says and does things when she is
provoked, frustrated or angered by her students and their provocation of her was very
real. As reflected in both testimony and exhibits, there were several students in
Respondent's class who often misbehaved, who acted out on a regular basis and who
were openly disrespectful to Respondent, sometimes in cruel and crude expression.
Although that provocation bears on penalty, it has no bearing on the truth of the
allegations made against her by the students who testified on the District's case.
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My findings are inconsistent with student AS' testimony. He testified for
Respondent and stated generally that Respondent did nothing of what she was accused of
having done. AS, however, liked Respondent and he and his mother were grateful for the
help Respondent had given them. It is not surprising, therefore, that he would want to
help her. But AS' categorical denial of every allegation against Respondent is no more
credible than Respondent's similar denial. The testimony in opposition by the other
students and the record as a whole is simply too compelling to be disregarded in its
entirety.
The witnesses' testimony, including A.S.'s, that several students may have plotted
to "get" Respondent is not dispositive of their credibility, even if true. Even if several of
the students were angry with Respondent, were friends with each other, and were happy
that Respondent had been charged and removed from their classroom, that does not mean
that the testimony those students gave was untruthful. Their testimony could be truthful
and their comments could reflect only their happiness with Respondent being removed as
their teacher. I have considered the motive ascribed to the students for allegedly lying in
evaluating the testimony of the students who testified against Respondent, reject that
ascribed motive, and find no reason to discredit their testimony in most material respects.
THE ALLEGATIONS
Specifications I(R) and II(C), H(D), II(E) are allegations of physical abuse.
In Specification I(R), the District alleges that "on at least one occasion"
Respondent "spit on student F's head." Student F is E.P. who testified at the hearing that
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Respondent spit on his head after she had denied his request to go to the bathroom.
According to E.P., he transferred from Respondent's class after that event. E.P.'s
testimony during the hearing is consistent with the statements he gave to school officials.
Specification I(R) is a most serious allegation. By itself, if true, it would expose a
teacher to grave discipline. There must, therefore, be factual specificity to the accusation
and the testimony supporting it. The testimony that Respondent "spit" on E.P. is
conclusory. From that alone, I cannot make a determination as to whether the expelling
of any spittle was accidental, such as might occur when words are spoken loudly and in
anger in close contact or whether it was a deliberate, foul act of disrespect. Although I
believe something happened, I cannot determine what that something was. In such
circumstances, the allegations must be dismissed for insufficiency of proof.
hi Specification II(C), the District alleges that Respondent "pushed student V.R.."
V.R. did not testify. Madera's notes of her meeting with V.R. are not competent to prove
Respondent's guilt. Of the students who testified, only E.P. testified that Respondent had
"pushed" V.R..
Respondent cannot be found guilty of this aspect of the charge on E.P.'s testimony
alone because it is devoid of context. Nothing is revealed on the record as to the nature
or circumstances of the alleged "push." As was the case with Specification I(R), the
District has not met it's burden of proof regarding this specification of the charge.
In Specification II(D), the District alleges, without detail, that Respondent "struck
various students in the class."
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F.C. and J.C. testified that Respondent hit S.M. with a phone on his head after an
argument. S.M. confirmed that he had been hit with a phone, but he did not claim that it
had been done on purpose. X.R. and S.T. believed it was an accident. E.P., apparently
referring to a different incident with a cell phone, testified that Respondent hit S.M. in the
forehead "on purpose."
There appear to be two separate incidents of Respondent allegedly "striking" S.M.
with a phone, one involving a phone affixed to the classroom wall, and the other with a
personal cell phone. The District has not carried its burden of proof as to either incident.
Neither is mentioned in any of the reports of interviews with S.M.. The first appears to
have been incidental contact which was unintentional. The second, as described by E.P.,
is again devoid of context. Thus, the accuracy of E.P. 's conclusion that the hit was
deliberate and retaliatory cannot be evaluated.
The only other reference to Respondent hitting S.M. is in a note in the incident
report of an interview with N.C. who did not testify. That note is conclusory and without
detail and it is not evidence competent to establish Respondent's guilt.
The incident report reflects that student E.R. reported that Respondent had
"grabbed" his neck. E.R. did not testify and there is no other competent evidence
establishing this incident occurred.
X.R. did not testify to being struck by papers as reflected in the incident report,
which by itself cannot establish Respondent's guilt.
The District has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent
struck students. This specification of the charge is, accordingly, dismissed.
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In Specification II(E), the District alleges that Respondent "slammed" a locker
door on X.R.'s finger. The preponderance of the credible evidence does not establish that
Respondent is guilty of this specification of the charges.
X.R.'s testimony establishes that his finger was caught in the locker door when the
door was closed by the Respondent. However, he conceded in his testimony that it might
have been an accident. ER's testimony that Respondent kicked the door onto X.R. 's
finger "deliberately" is conclusory and without the context needed for evaluation, hi any
event, E.P.'s opinion as to the deliberateness of Respondent's action is not entitled to any
more weight than X.R.'s testimony that the locker could have been closed accidentally.
The balance of the charges in Specification II relate to Respondent's policies
regarding students' use of the bathroom and comments she allegedly made to students
who asked to use the bathroom.
In Specification II(A), Respondent is charged with denying student "S" use of the
bathroom "on or about October 23, 1997." This specification is dismissed. The identity
of student "S" cannot be reasonably ascertained from the record. Moreover, there is
nothing in the record establishing that students are entitled as of right to leave the
classroom to go to the bathroom whenever they want simply by asking. Therefore, even
if Respondent had denied student "S's" request to go to the bathroom, that, without more,
is not corporal punishment.
In Specification II(B). the District alleges that Respondent refused to let student
F.S. go to the bathroom "when he desperately had to go to the restroom." The retaliatory
withholding of access to bathroom facilities to punish a student for misbehaving in
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circumstances in which there is objective evidence of a physical need to use those
facilities is at least arguably corporal punishment in violation of the Regulation.
F.S. did not testify. Therefore, circumstances underlying this allegation cannot be
assessed objectively. F.C.'s testimony that Respondent had refused F.S. permission to
use the bathroom establishes only the denial, not the circumstances underlying it. As
noted above, the denial of a student's request to use the bathroom during class, without
more, is not corporal punishment.
In Specification II(F), Respondent is accused of telling unnamed students in the
class words to the effect of "shit on yourselves" when they asked to use the restroom.
None of the students who testified at the hearing referred to Respondent having
said these or similar words in this context. The only evidence in support of this
allegation is a record of Garcia's interview with student D (N.C.) who did not testify.
That is insufficient to establish Respondent's guilt.
The balance of the charges in Specification I are allegations that Respondent
verbally abused students by using offensive language.
Specification I(A) alleges that Respondent called F. V. "dumb" and a "dummy" on
or about September 30, 1997. F.V. did not testify. There is no evidence of such a
comment being made to F.V. in or around that time. This specification is dismissed for
failure of proof.
hi Specification I(B) and I(H), Respondent is alleged to have said to E.P., in late
October 1997, that she would throw him out of the window. E.P. testified during the
hearing that Respondent said this to him. The comments he, F.C. and S.M. made to
31

school officials as recorded by them are consistent with E.P.'s testimony at the hearing,
although they vary in some details I find not to be significant.
F.C., S.M. and X.P. testified similarly, except S.M. believed the comment was
made to E.P. in the Spring of 1998. However, S.M.'s notes record the comment as
having been made to E.P. at an earlier date. J.C. testified that Respondent made a
comment similar in content to unidentified students who were playing with the class
computer. I find this to have been a separate event. The statement in issue was made
directly to E.P..
As to this statement, I find that Respondent told E.P. that she would throw him out
of the window he was at or near at the time the comment was made. There is consistency
in the witnesses' testimony and corroboration in the documentary evidence. Moreover,
the nature of the statement is not one likely to have been fabricated by the students who
testified.
The context in which the statement was made is fairly clear. E.P. at the time had
been misbehaving,. He was out of his seat and he had been talking in class. From the
context in which the statement was made, it is reasonable to infer that the remark was not
intended to be humorous. Rather, it was most likely one uttered out of frustration and
anger.
Common to Specifications I(C), (K) and (O) are allegations that Respondent told
students, or suggested to them in statements she made to them, that she is prejudiced
against Dominicans and Puerto Ricans.

32

Respondent's sixth grade class at P.S. 528 consists mostly of students of
Dominican nationality. Respondent is African-American, one of the two AfricanAmerican teachers in the school. Respondent began teaching in New York City in 1983.
Respondent worked as a fifth grade teacher in 1995-96 and again in 1996-97. She was
also a math coordinator. She began teaching sixth grade in 1997-98 in approximately the
third week of September 1997, after a grievance was concluded in her favor regarding
assignment. Until her assignment in late September, substitutes were assigned to teach
the sixth grade class at P.S. 528.
With regard to Specifications I(C), (K) and (O), several students testified to
Respondent having made such comments to them. There is, moreover, corroboration of
the witnesses' testimony in the documents summarizing their interviews with school
officers.
The testimony varies in its detail regarding the comments allegedly made.
F.C. testified that S.M. asked Respondent whether she treated the class "that way"
because they are Dominican to which Respondent allegedly responded "Yes, what are
you going to do about it?" F.C. also testified, however, that he could not recall what
Respondent said in response to S.M.'s question.
J.C. testified that Respondent told the class she is a "racist" and "hates
Dominicans." The latter comment appears from J.C.'s testimony to have been made after
S.M. had called Respondent a "black bitch."
S.M. testified that when a student asked Respondent if she was a "racist,"
Respondent allegedly responded "I'm a racist against Dominicans." X.R. also testified
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that Respondent stated to the class that she doesn't "like Dominicans" after S.M. cursed
at her. It is unclear, however, whether these were different comments or the same one
being described differently in the students' testimony.
E.R testified that Respondent told the class that "she doesn't like Dominicans and
Puerto Ricans."
It is not reasonably possible to conclude precisely what Respondent said to the
students because there are differences in the students' descriptions of Respondent's
comments. It is also not possible to determine precisely the number of times the
Respondent made statements of the type alleged because the students' testimony likely
overlaps. I do find that on more than one occasion, Respondent made statements to one
or more students which left them with the impression that her treatment of them, which
the students regarded as "bad," was based on their nationality.
The context in which these statements were made is not well defined on the
record. One or more appear to have been prompted by a student inquiry. One or more
others appear to have been a spontaneous response to an insult made to Respondent by
one of her students. Those the Respondent made in response to a student's inquiry
appear actually to have been a sarcastic denial of the students' inquiry as to whether
Respondent was a racist. In effect, Respondent may have been denying the allegation,
but the response was made in a way that these students would not have understood that
she was saying she was not a racist.
Respondent's comment regarding her "hatred" of Dominicans appears fairly
clearly to have been her reply to degrading comments made to her by one or more of the
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students. Her anger is understandable, but the response is still unacceptable under the
District's well-established policies.
In Specification 1(D), the District alleges that Respondent used vulgarity to the
class in describing parental involvement.
Only S.M. testified about this allegation. According to S.M., Respondent made
the statement after his father came to class and spoke to the students According to S.M.,
Respondent was upset and said she was "not taking this shit."
According to Respondent. S.M.'s father disrupted the class. Lois Roher testified
that S.M.'s father was antagonistic and disruptive by arguing in front of the class in the
middle of a lesson.
That no other students referred to this incident evidences that the comment, if
made, was made only to S.M. in a voice low enough that no one else heard the comment.
S.M.'s written statement reflects that Respondent only "started" to say what she is
accused of having said. That no one else testified about the comment evidences either
that the comments were never made, or that they did not hear them, or that they were
never questioned about them such that they did not remember to mention the comments
of their own volition.
On the basis of S.M.'s testimony as corroborated by the documentary evidence, I
find Respondent said in a low voice that she would not "take shit" from parents.
Respondent's and Roher's testimony actually further buttresses S.M.'s testimony because
it is reasonable to infer that Respondent was angry over S.M.'s father's disruption of her
class. There being evidence on this record to establish that Respondent curses when she
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is angry, at least in a low tone, this Specification of the charges is sustained to that extent,
but otherwise dismissed.
Specifications I(E), (F) and (G) allege that Respondent made derogatory
references to S.M. and V.R. on or about December 8, 1997. V.R. did not testify.
According to S.M.'s testimony and his personal notes, Respondent called him and
V.R. "chipmunks" who make "trouble." F.C. testified similarly.
S.M. also testified that Respondent told V.R. he was "full of shit" after V.R. had
been arguing with her in December. V.R. made the same report to Principal Madera in
early December.
There is some discrepancy in S.M.'s account. His personal notes reflect that the
"chipmunk" comment about S.M. and V.R. and the "full of shit" comment allegedly
made to V.R. were made on December 8, 1997 when S.M. and V.R. came to class.
However, in the January incident report of S.M.'s interview, it is recorded that S.M.
stated that both comments were made on January 11, 1998.
It is not reasonable to conclude that Respondent made the exact same comments to
the same two students in December and again in January. I find, however, that the
preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that the comments were made. The
incident report either records the date incorrectly in the interview notes, or S.M. changed
the date of the comments to January to make the comments coincide with the date of this
interview. The first, if true, is inconsequential because it does not bear on S.M.'s
credibility. If the latter is true, it is material because S.M.'s willingness to tell Cambrier
and Madera that the comments were made on a date other than the one on which they
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were actually made evidences S.M.'s willingness to either lie or his inability to recollect.
The latter is not a reasonable conclusion because S.M. would have remembered in
January when he interviewed with Cambrier and Madera a statement he claims in that
interview to have been made that same day.
1 find that S.M. changed the dates of Respondent's comments to further persuade
Cambrier and Madera to believe him. That act, however, does not mean that S.M. also
lied about the comments having been made and there is evidence independent of S.M.'s
testimony that corroborates his testimony that the statements were made.
S.M. also testified and recorded that Respondent called him "stupid" and a
"dummy." For the same reasons as above, I find those comments to have been made.
The allegations in I(G) concern comments made specifically to S.M. on or about
December 8, 1997. These allegations are based on S.M.'s personal notes taken on
December 8, 10 and 12 of comments allegedly made by Respondent on or about those
dates.
I find no reason to discredit S.M.'s testimony or his recorded notes. That evidence
establishes that Respondent made all of the alleged statements except "I am sick of you."
That specification is dismissed. I also find that these remarks, like most or all of the
others, were made out of frustration or anger stemming from S.M.'s continuing pattern of
misbehavior. Some of them, such as in Specifications I(G)(2) and I(G)(5) were likely
attempts to motivate S.M., but they were poorly and inappropriately worded.
Specifications 1(1), (J), (M), (N) and (P) allege that Respondent used derogatory
references to her students and "curse words."
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I have previously summarized the record bearing upon these allegations in
sufficient detail. I find that Respondent used all of these words to her students, except
"bitch," "bum" and "fucking." That part of Specification I(N) alleging that a student was
called a bum is dismissed as is I(P). The record does not sufficiently establish
Respondent's use of those words to her class generally or to a specific student. In all
other respects, the students' testimony and other record evidence establish that these
words were used, again either out of frustration or anger or in a misguided attempt to
motivate the class to work harder, pay attention and do better.
In Specification I(L), Respondent is accused of telling a student to "urinate on
herself." From the record, this student is R.G., who did not testify. Others testified that
they heard the remark. All were consistent in their description of the content of the
remark and the circumstances underlying it.
R.G. had been asking to go to the bathroom frequently that day. When she asked
again, Respondent, according to F.C., said "no" and she could "pee on herself if she had
to." F.C., however, was unsure about Respondent's response. J.C. confirmed
Respondent's comment and added that R.G. was "crying at the time." What cannot be
ascertained from the record, however, is whether R.G. was crying in pain from the need
to go to the bathroom or was crying simply because her request had been denied. X.R.
testified similarly, adding that R.G. was misbehaving when Respondent made the
comment.
I find no reason to discredit the several students' testimony. This is not the type of
allegation students would have made up and then conspired to lie about. Moreover, it is
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consistent with what is an apparent pattern of Respondent becoming vocally angry when
her students misbehaved. The I(L) charge is sustained
In Specification I(Q), Respondent is accused of telling the "class" that she was not
wearing "panties" so they should not "look up my skirt."
Although there is testimony about this comment, none of the students place it any
context and it is difficult to believe that Respondent would say something like this out of
the blue. Nonetheless, F.C. testified that Respondent made the comment to the class on a
date he did not know and for reasons he did not know or speculate about. S.T. testified,
however, that the comment was made to him because Respondent accused him of
"looking up her skirt." However, Garcia's report reflects that V.R. stated that
Respondent had accused him of the act and made the statement to V.R.. On cross
examination, however, he stated that the comment was made to "the whole class I think"
and he did not know whether a student had first made a comment to her.
Despite the personal nature of the allegation, and regardless of whether
Respondent in fact was or was not wearing panties, I find no reason to discredit the
students' testimony, which is consistent in general. It is not known from this record why
Respondent made the comment. Perhaps it was nothing more than an attempt at humor
or levity. Even if the comment was well-intentioned, however, it was improper. If a
student was attempting to look under her skirt, a statement telling that student to stop
would have been appropriate. The comment about not wearing panties was entirely
gratuitous and improper.
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Specification I(S), alleging that the Respondent stuck out her middle finger at a
student in a vulgar gesture, is dismissed. There is no competent evidence establishing
that Respondent ever did this. The only evidence of this is contained in the Garcia notes
of an interview with X.R., who did not testify. Respondent cannot be found guilty of an
allegation on this type of evidence alone.
Finally, the general charge of insubordination is dismissed. There is no evidence
that the Respondent willfully refused to carry out a legitimate order or directive which is
the well-established basis for such a charge. If the District means that any misconduct by
the Respondent also constitutes insubordination, then the charge is redundant, not
traditional, and otherwise dealt with by my specific rulings on each charge.
PENALTY
In assessing penalty, it is necessary and appropriate to consider both the general
purposes of charges under Education Law §3020-a and the facts of the particular case.
Counsel for the parries are in agreement that the primary function of a §3020-a
proceeding is not punitive. Rather, the purpose is to determine the fitness of a teacher to
carry on their professional responsibilities. Termination of a tenured teacher should not
result unless there is no reasonable likelihood that the teacher could be fit to teach after
imposition of a penalty other than termination.
Length of service, job performance, including prior discipline, and the nature of
the allegations which the teacher has been found guilty are all relevant in assessing
j. enalty.
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Respondent began as an elementary school teacher in 1973. Her ratings while
with the District have been at least satisfactory, except for the school year in issue when
she was rated "unsatisfactory" and in 1994.
With regard to the latter year, counsel for the parties stipulated during the hearing
that Respondent in 1994 agreed to settle disciplinary charges that alleged instances of
verbal and physical abuse. Counsel introduced for consideration of penalty only a copy of
that settlement. Respondent expressly acknowledged that it is inappropriate to "use
unprofessional, threatening or crude language" with students and also inappropriate to
use "excessive physical force in disciplining students. In that settlement, Respondent
also acknowledged that she should endeavor to use "all appropriate disciplinary measures
in dealing with student misbehavior and to seek the assistance of the school
administration in controlling students fighting." Respondent denied all of those 1994
allegations and there was no adjudication on the merits, except she admitted to eating in
class and to not intervening in fights between students. Respondent agreed to a fine of
$1,000 and to transfer to either first grade or kindergarten, as available, and in the
discretion of the Superintendent of Community School District 5. Respondent was also
rated unsatisfactory that year (1994).
In March 1996 and May 1997, Sharon Weissbrot, the Supervisor in Charge3 at
P.S. 528, wrote letters of recommendation for Respondent at Respondent's request.
Weissbrot described Respondent in the March 1996 as "reliable and a dedicated
professional and an asset to my school." Referring to her fifth-grade teaching in 1996-97,
3

Tliis is the title assigned when there is no principal assigned to a school.
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Weissbrot concluded that Respondent "demonstrated good classroom control and works
hard with the children."
Notwithstanding the above, Respondent knows that it is inappropriate to use
offensive language to or with students. The verbal comments made by Respondent to her
students clearly constitute ground for the imposition of discipline. What is of concern is
that these are not isolated instances. During the school year in question, the inappropriate
comments were made openly and regularly. Many, if not all, were made in frustration or
out of anger and were retaliatory in nature for the purpose of belittling the students.
Whether the statements had the intended effect and, if so, to what extent can not be
determined with any precision. There is some testimony and other indications that
certain of the students were hurt by the Respondent's comments. My penalty
determination, however, would be the same even if no students were in fact "damaged"
by Respondent's statements. Teachers are not and cannot be allowed to make such
comments on a regular basis to relatively young children no matter how "street wise"
they may be. There are other methods of recourse such as notice to the Principal, to the
Board of Education itself, and the teachers' union. The Respondent did not pursue those
methods as she promised to do in the 1994 settlement.
At the same time, one cannot ignore the pressure Respondent was under in trying
to maintain discipline and teach class. By all measures, including the students' own
testimony , several of the students had severe behavioral problems that resulted in their
disrupting the class often. Some of the students were regularly out of control and were
blatantly disrespectful of Respondent personally and professionally, hi significant ways,
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many of Respondent's comments appear to have been provoked. This may explain, but
does not excuse Respondent's conduct for which she is fully accountable, but it is a factor
to be considered in assessing penalty.
hi my judgment, the Respondent is subject to severe discipline, either discharge or
a lengthy suspension without pay, for the charges sustained. Some factors support the
latter penalty. Respondent has long service as a teacher with satisfactory ratings, except
for 1994 and during the pendency of these charges. Several charges against her,
particularly the allegations of physical abuse, have been dismissed. Her conduct may
have been largely provoked by several students with severe behavior problems, who were
disrespectful of and insulting to the Respondent and uninterested in learning. Her prior
discipline was in the nature of a settlement and was not based on findings of guilt for
similar misconduct. Finally, there is a well-noticed need for and lack of certified teachers
in the New York City school system.
However, there are fatal impediments to her reinstatement pursuant to my order. I
have sustained the charges relating to the disparaging sentiments expressed by
Respondent regarding Dominicans (and Puerto Ricans) generally and particularly about
and to her Dominican students. These charges standing alone, and certainly when viewed
in the context of the others I have sustained, persuade me that Respondent's credibility,
stature and effectiveness as a teacher of Dominican and Puerto Rican students has been
destroyed and, I believe, irrevocably.
If Respondent were reinstated, even after a lengthy unpaid suspension, my
authority would permit me to direct her reinstatement only to the position she held at P.S.
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528 when she was suspended. Under that circumstance, in my view, the Respondent
would be unable and unfit to perform her duties because most of the students at P.S. 528
are Dominican. Indeed, the vast majority of students in District 6 are Dominican or
Puerto Rican.
I do not have the authority to reassign the Respondent to a different school district
or to direct her reinstatement to a different teaching environment where she would have
less contact with Dominican or Puerto Rican students. Nor, in my view, do I have the
authority to reinstate the Respondent to a lower class level at P.S. 528 where the student
behavioral problems may be less frequent and less severe.
Therefore, I have no choice but to find and hold that for the charges sustained
herein, there is just cause for the Respondent's discharge. The District and the Board of
Education, in their exclusive discretion, may consider mitigation of penalty. A
disciplinary suspension without pay in lieu of discharge should be on a last chance basis
and run from the parties' receipt of this award through the beginning of school year 20012002. My personal view is that if such an arrangement was made following the
suggested period of suspension without pay (consistent with the well-established
purposes of that type of progressive discipline step), the Respondent could be
rehabilitated and could renew a satisfactory teaching career.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Officer in the captioned matter,
and having heard the proof and allegations of the named parties, makes the following
Award.
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AWARD
Respondent Elizabeth W. Witter is guilty of the charges contained in
Specifications I(B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G) (as noted); (H), (I), (J) (as noted), (K), (L),
(M), (N) (as noted), (O), (Q). Those sustained charges constitute just cause for
Respondent's discharge. The other Specifications are dismissed.

Dated:
Eric J. Schmertz
Hearing Officer

State of New York

)
)ss:
County of New York )
I hereby affirm that I am the individual described herein and who executed this
instrument which is my Award.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-x
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
..;•'
|
between
OPINION AND AWARD
N?W YORK'S HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICE
Uv-iON 1199/SEIU, AFL-CIO

:;

CASE #133000044600

-and-

THE BROOKLYN HOSPITAL
-X

The
(hereinafter

issue
referred

is
to

whether
as

the

THE

BROOKLYN

"Hospital")

HOSPITAL

violated

its

collective bargaining agreement with the above-named Union and
the applicable Delinquency Policy and Procedure of the Local 144
Hospital Funds, by failing to make required contributions to the
1199 Health Care Employees Pension
division

the

Local

for the

(hereinafter referred to as the "Pension

1199 Health
Division

Fund

Care Employees Benefit Fund

for the

144 Hospital
Fund," to the
144 Hospital

(hereinafter referred to as the "Benefit Fund," and to
144 Hospital

(hereinafter

referred

and Health
to

as

the

Facilities
"Education

Education
Fund")

for

Fund,
the

respective periods of May 1, 2000 through July 31, 2000;
October 1, 1999 through May 31, 2000; and October 1, 1999 through
August 31, 2000.
A hearing was duly scheduled for September 18, 2000,
notice

of which

was duly

served on the parties,

Certified Mail on the Hospital.

including by

Representatives of the Union appeared at the hearing.
No representative of the Hospital appeared and no communication
from the Hospital was received.
I
hearing

granted

in

the

the

absence

Union's
of

the

motion

to

Hospital

proceed

and

the

with

the

proofs

and

allegations of the Union were heard.
The Hospital and the Union are signatories to and/or
bound

to a collective

Policy

and

Procedure

bargaining
of

the

agreement

Local

144

and a

Hospital

Delinquency
Funds

which

require the Hospital to make regular and timely contributions to
the

three

aforesaid

contributions

Funds.

Delinquencies

in

making

those

are subject to action in arbitration, as in the

instant case.
The
delinquency

Arbitrator

is

authorized

to

order

payment

of

contributions, with interest as well as to assess

against a delinquent employer, attorney fees and the fee of the
arbitrator.
The evidence adduced at the hearing on September 18,
2000, clearly established that the Hospital is delinquent in
making contributions to and therefore owes the following net sums
to the following Funds:
To the Pension Fund for the period
May 1, 2000 through July 31, 2000. . . .$
with interest in the amount of
Total

457,804.32

$

6, 685.72

$

464,490.04

Also, THE BROOKLYN HOSPITAL is directed
forthwith to pay to the Union the sums of
$600 and $700 representing attorney fees and
the Arbitrator's fee.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

September 28, 2000

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION
Case #193900006500

-andCARMEL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the District violated
Article VII Section A.4 of the
collective bargaining agreement when
it failed to appoint TIMOTHY JONES to
the vacant position of Cleaner/
Groundsman working days? If not,
what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held at the District' s offices on May
17th

and June

14th, 2000, at which time Mr.

Jones, hereinafter

referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the abovenamed Union and District appeared.
full opportunity
and cross-examine

All concerned were afforded

to offer evidence and argument and to examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived

and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant, a Night Cleaner, was bypassed
Cleaner/Groundsman
applicant

day

job

in

favor of Howard

for the

McCutcheon,

an

from outside the bargaining unit, and not employed by

the District at that time.

As such, it is undisputed

grievant was senior to McCutcheon.

that the

The
undisputed,

evidence
that

establishes

McCutcheon

Cleaner/Groundsman

was

and

it

more

job than the grievant.

is

essentially

qualified

for

the

Whether the grievant

was qualified, is disputed.
However,

at the threshold

is a dispute

between

the

parties over the meaning and application of Article VII Section
A.4 of the contract.

It reads:

ARTICLE Vn - SENIORITY. TRANSFERS. PROMOTIONS. VACANCIES
A.
Vacancy - All vacancies which
occur
within the CSEA Bargaining Unit shall be
posted by the Employer on the Employee
Bulletin Boards and a copy of such vacancy
notice shall be forwarded to the President of
the C.S.E.A. Bargaining Unit.
4. The employer, when filling a vacancy on a
permanent
basis,
shall
give
first
consideration to an employee covered by this
Agreement,
provided
the
applicant
is
qualified to fill the vacancy.
Preference
shall be given to the most senior applicant
when
the
Employer
determines
that
qualifications
of
the
applicants
are
relatively equal.
The District asserts that its obligation thereunder is
to

accord

an

incumbent

applicant

"first

consideration"

in

assessing all the applicants, but that said applicant, even with
the

greater

vacancy.

seniority

not

guaranteed

Rather, following a bonafide

incumbent/senior
select

is

applicant,

the applicant

the District

appointment

"consideration"
retains

the

it deems better qualified, even

applicant is an "outsider" and/or of lesser seniority.

to

the

of the
right to
if that

That asserts the District is what it did here.
claims

that

grievant,
grievant

it

but,

gave

due

and

"first"

consideration

based on that consideration

with McCutcheon,

and

It

to

the

comparing

the

deemed the latter better qualified.

Also, in doing so, the District states that it determined that
the grievant was unqualified for the vacancy.
The Union's position is simply that the relevant part
of Article VII Section A. 4 is the first sentence of sub-Section
4, namely:
"The employer, when filling a vacancy on a
permanent
basis,
shall
give
first
consideration to an employee covered by this
Agreement,
provided
the
applicant
is
qualified to fill the vacancy."
It asserts that means that an "inside" employee like
the grievant, has a priority for appointment over any "outsider,"
like McCutcheon,

and if qualified is contractually

entitled to

the appointment even if the "outsider" is better qualified.
addition

to claiming that the grievant was qualified,

In

the Union

argues that the contractual requirement of "first consideration"
means an entitlement to the job, not, as the District seems to be
arguing, an entitlement only to "consideration" for the vacancy.
Clearly,

if the District's interpretation is correct,

the only question is whether the grievant received a bonafide and
good faith "first consideration," and that if so, the appointment

of

McCutcheon

thereafter

was

a proper

exercise

of

retained

managerial authority.
But, if the Union's interpretation

is correct, then

the issue turns on whether the grievant was qualified.
so,

his

appointment,

instead

of

McCutcheon,

And, if

would

be

consider

the

practice"

and

contractually mandated.
It
conflicting

is

my

judgment

evidence

and

that

I

testimony

need
of

not

"past

negotiation history of and under Article VII Section A.4; because
I do not find that contact provision to be ambiguous or unclear.
My interpretation of Article VII Section A. 4 is that
the

contract

language

logical result.

is

clear

and

susceptible

to

only

one

And that result is supported by the persuasive

testimony of a witness for the District.

I deal with the latter

first.
James Mahoney, the District's Director of Facilities
testified

forthrightly

that

in

considering

an

"internal"

candidate verses an "outside candidate" (the circumstances in the
instant

case)

qualified"
"no

the

"internal

(emphasis added) .

guarantee

if

the

candidate gets the

job if he is

He went on to state that there is

internal

candidate

is

not

qualified,"

meaning obviously that the internal candidate is guaranteed the
job

if he

qualified.

is qualified, over an outsider who may

be better

I accept his testimony as the correct resolution of

the threshold question before me; leaving only the matter of the
grievant's

qualifications,

(which

Mahoney

testified

were

inadequate).
My own interpretation of Article VII Section A. 4 is
similar.
first

Subsection 4 covers two different circumstances.

sentence

of

Subsection

4

applies

to

application

The
from

bargaining unit employees, who are qualified.
In my view, the second sentence comes into play only
if the conditions and circumstances of the first sentence are not
met.
More specifically, under the first sentence, permanent
vacancies

are

to

be

filled

applicant who is qualified.
under

the

second

sentence

by

a

bargaining

unit

employee/

If there is no such applicant, then,
the

District

may

consider

all

applicants, outsiders as well as insiders and is restricted to
selecting

the

senior applicant only

if he has

qualifications

equal to the others.
To my mind,

if as the

District

argues,

the

second

sentence covers all circumstances, the first sentence would be
rendered meaningless.
inside

For the District could always accord an

candidate "first consideration"

in an interview

and an

assessment of qualifications, but could always moot that process
by going to the outside for what it deems a "better qualified"
candidate.

The "first consideration" requirement could be so

manipulated to be rendered sterile.

I am not persuaded that any

such result was intended or should obtain.

In short, I interpret

"first consideration" to mean that an incumbent employee who is
qualified for the vacancy shall be appointed to it and may not be
pre-empted by an outside applicant.
means

that

the

grievant

was

Applied to the instant case

entitled not

just

to

a

"first

consideration" assessment and interview, but was entitled to the
job

of

Cleaner/Groundsman

if

he

was

qualified,

the

better

qualifications of the outsider, McCutcheon, notwithstanding.
With the foregoing interpretation, the issue narrows
to whether

the grievant was qualified to fill the vacancy in

question.
The District found the grievant unqualified because of
undependable
equipment

attendance,

lack

of

experience

with

certain

such as snow ploughs, sand trucks, a back hoe and a

front end loader, a lack of knowledge of the formula to lay out
an athletic field and "borderline" work as a Cleaner.
Generally, on matters of ability, Arbitrators accord a
presumption

of

validity

employee, unless
arbitrary,
however,

an

employer's

evaluation

of

an

it is shown that the employer's judgement is

capricious,
the

to

discriminatory or unreasonable.

District's

testimony

is

in

documentation of the grievant's work record.

conflict
His yearly

with

Here,
its

Performance Evaluations from 1992 to 2000 have been
"satisfactory" except for the evaluation dated June 1995 which
concluded

that

he

"needs

improvement."

Yet

that

evaluator

stated, significantly:
"I do not feel that Tim is happy in the
position of Night Cleaner he now holds.
I_
feel he would better serve the District in a
position such as Groundsman where he worked
and has shown he can do the job and enjoys
doing so" (emphasis added).
More significant, in my judgement are the evaluations
of June 26, 1992 and October 5, 1992, covering a six month period
during which he served as a substitute Groundsman.
judged him

The former

"satisfactory" in all listed categories.

And the

latter judged him either "outstanding" or "satisfactory" in the
listed categories, with an overall rating of "High Satisfactory."
The comments on the latter are worth noting.

Supervision stated:

"Tim, as a sub has been working as a
Groundsman.
He has been taking over and
keeps up with the sports activities in
keeping the fields up to date:
He uses the bobcat mower in areas where it is
meant to be used with no trouble.
Tim also
set up a schedule for cutting grass around
the high school.
To present, Tim has not
done any cleaning but as a Groundsman due to
his attitude and willingness to do a good
job, at present, I feel he would be an asset
to the Carmel School system."
The Evaluations show that an acknowledged attendance
problem he experienced in 1998-1999, apparently due to a personal
difficulty,

is not a chronic situation and has

satisfactory level.

improved to a

It

seems

to

me

that

the

reasons

advanced

by

the

District at the hearings as disqualifying factors in considering
the grievant for the Cleaner/Groundsman day job, would and should
have

made

reflected

appearances
in

a

rating

in

or

other

noted
than

those

Evaluations,

"satisfactory."

And

and
any

inabilities in operating required equipment would have been noted
in the June-October

1992 Evaluations.

Similarly,

it has been

five years since he received disciplinary memos in 1994 and 1995.
And,

again,

they

were not

of

the magnitude

or

relevance to

reflect adversely on his Evaluation ratings.
All

in

all,

I

must

conclude

that

the

written

Performance Evaluations over these several years, and especially
those

relating

to

the

grievant's

six

months

in

the

job

of

Groundsman, rebut the hearing testimony on his qualifications.
And

I must conclude

therefore that the general presumption

in

favor of an employer's assessment of an employee's qualifications
has

been

employment

similarly

rebutted

in

this

case

record, making the District's

by

the

grievant's

explanations

in this

arbitration, unreasonable, and hence, reversible.
Finally, any fair reading of the job description of
Cleaner/Groundsman

against

the

backdrop

of

the

grievant's

Performance Evaluations, his testimony of other relevant jobs he
has held and his Adult and Continuing Education activities would

lead to a reasonable conclusion that the grievant was qualified
and capable of performing or quickly learning the duties
required, including the operation of the equipment used, and that
his bid should have been accepted.
The Undersigned,

duly designated

as the

Arbitrator,

and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties, makes the following AWARD:
The District violated Article VII
Section
A. 4
of
the
collective
bargaining agreement when it failed
to appoint TIMOTHY JONES to the
vacant position of Cleaner/Groundsman
working days.
The District is directed to appoint
Mr. Jones to the Cleaner/Groundsman
position on days.

Eric J/ Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

August 25, 2000

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION
SERVICE ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case* 00122103672-7

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES LOCAL 1340 (UNION)

-andFEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL AVIATION FACILITIES TECHNICAL
CENTER ("EMPLOYER")

-X

The stipulated issue is:
1. Is the grievance of NANCY DAVENPORT
arbitrable?
2. If so, did the Technical center
violate the collective bargaining
agreement
by
not
paying
Ms.
Davenport properly for the level of
the work she performed from 1993 to
April 25, 1999?
And, if so, what
shall be the remedy?

A hearing "was held at the Technical Center at Atlantic
City Airport on April 18, 2000.
Davenport,

hereinafter

representatives

of

the

Said hearing was attended by Ms.

referred

to

above-named

as
Union

the

"grievant"

and

and

Employer.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument

and

to

examine

and

cross-examine

witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant's claim is simply that from 1993 to April
25, 1999, while she was a member of the bargaining unit and

classified as a grade 7 secretary, she was performing the duties
of the higher, grade 8 secretary classification.

And that for

the period involved she should be compensated retroactively at
the grade 8 rate.
wages

in

the

amount

Specifically, her claim is for additional
of

$17,640

plus

a

consequential

adjustment in her present non-bargaining unit compensation.

Arbitrability
The Employer asserts that the grievance is not
arbitrable because:
(a)

The grievant lacks standing to file or
process a grievance under the grievance
and arbitration provisions of the
contract because she is no longer in the
bargaining unit, no longer covered by
the contract and therefore lacks access
to dispute settlement procedure of the
contract.

(b)

The grievance is untimely in that it was
not filed "within fifteen (15) calendar
days of the incident giving rise to the
grievance..." as required by Step 1 of
Section 8.

(c)

The grievance involves "the
classification of (a) position" which,

upward

by the provisions of Section 3.5 of
Article 30, is expressly precluded from
the grievance procedure.
At the hearing, I rejected the Employer's assertions
in (a) above.

I ruled, consistent with well-established arbitral

principle, that an employee may assert an alleged contract right
for the period he or she is covered by the contract even if at
the time the claim is initiated the employee is no longer covered
by the contract or within the contractual bargaining unit.1
With regard to (b) above, I do not construe the
fifteen (15) calendar day time limit as a "statute of limitation"
on the right to grieve.

Rather, I am satisfied that it is a time

limit designed for two purposes.

First, to expedite the

processing of grievances so they do not "fester" and secondly,
for the consideration of an arbitrator, as a possible limitation
in any back pay remedy.

It is significant that the contract

language regarding the presentation of the grievance from Step 1
to Step 2 uses the permissive word "may" (i.e. "...may then be
filed within fifteen (15) calendar days...").

But the language

regarding the Employer's reply is more mandatory.

It requires

supervision to answer the grievance "no later than fifteen (15)

On April 25, 1999, the grievant's job was organizationally changed from a bargaining unit
position to one that is excluded from the unit.

calendar days..." (emphasis added) .

If the latter mandatory

restriction was intended also for the presentation of grievances,
similar mandatory language would or should have been used as
well.

The distinction is significant, especially where

arbitration is presumptively favored unless expressly curtailed
(see Steelworker Trilogy).
I do not find the fifteen (15) day provision to be
such a curtailment on the presentation of a grievance.
I do not find that Section 3.5 of Article 30 precludes
the grievability of the instant issue.
a "classification of any position."

I do not see this case as

Neither the grievant nor the

Union is challenging the existing secretarial classifications.
Nor are they seeking substantive changes in any classification.
Rather, within the established classification system, the
grievant and the Union, on her behalf, are claiming that she has
been performing the work of a higher (but existing)
classification, namely that of the grade 8.

In other words, I

see the grievance as a "garden variety" claim of pay for work
within a higher rated job classification, or what is commonly
known as an "out-of-title" work grievance.

So, whereas Section

3.5 prohibits a challenge to the substance of a particular
classification, or a change in on existing classification(s), the
instant grievance is nothing more than a claim that a particular
existing classification, namely that of a grade 8 secretary has
been applicable to the grievant's work duties for the period of

time asserted.

As such, it is not what Section 3.5 precludes as

a grievance.
Accordingly, I find the grievance arbitrable.

The Merits
The grievant's case is based primarily on the claim
that the secretarial duties set forth in the job descriptions of
both grade 7 and grade 8 secretarial classifications are
identical.

And that, therefore, the grievant's work performance,

slotted at grade 7 during the period 1993 to April 1999 was
synonymous with grade 8, entitling her to the higher rate of pay.
The trouble with her case in this arbitration is twofold.

First, there is no specific evidence of the particular

duties she performed, so that I cannot judge whether the details
of those duties, the extent performed, the level of
responsibility and the degree of complexity fell within grade 7
or grade 8.

This is not to say that she did not do things

regularly that met the grade 8 level, but rather that with the
paucity of probation evidence on the details of what she did, the
requisite burden of proving the elements of the grievance has not
been met.
Second, the Union's position notwithstanding, there is
a difference between the two-job description.

The difference

relates to the organizational level for which or within which the

secretary works.

Grade 7 applies to an organizational group

identified as a "Section."

Grade 8 applies to a larger

organizational group identified as a "Director's" or "Division"
level.

The latter is referred to in the job description as "Work

Situation C."

The former as "Work Situations A and B."

The Employer asserts that Situation C, applicable to a
larger organizational group, requires greater responsibilities,
though the identification of the type of work duties may appear
the same between grades 7 and 8.

It points out that the grievant

worked for a "Section Manager" at a "branch" (apparently within a
Section) and that therefore, based on the level of the
organization and the lesser responsibilities of that level, the
grade 7 classification was proper.
The foregoing testimony by the Employer on the
"differences" between grade 7 and grade 8 were not contradicted
or refuted by the Union or the grievant.

And, again, in the

absence of evidence on the specific details of the grievant's
work duties, I am unable to find that there is no difference in
the responsibilities of the secretarial work at and for the
Employer's organizational distinctions, or that the grievant's
actual duties and responsibilities crossed the line or otherwise
were indistinguishable from what is required at grade 8.

So, the

burden on the grievant and the Union to prove, clearly and
convincingly, that the grievant worked at grade 8 level, has not
been adequately met.

Accordingly, based on the meager evidence

presented I cannot find a violation of the contract by the
Employer.
However, arbitrations are not always limited to bare
technicalities or to just an adjudication of contract rights.
The process is also a search for truth and, at times, calls for
the application of equitable principles (see Steelworkers
Trilogy).
Here, there is clear evidence that the grievant is
fully capable of performing grade 8 secretarial work, and
importantly, was cited for her professional dedication,
excellence of work and for taking on added and additional
responsibilities.
On at least two occasions she was, in fact,
temporarily promoted to the grade 8 level, and performed at that
level well.

Additionally, she received several monetary and

time-off awards and citations for her willingness and ability to
take on extra duties and responsibilities, concededly beyond her
regular grade 7 tasks.

And, while she received some monetary

awards (or time-off) for this extra work, I believe that it can
be logically argued and concluded that that extra work may have
been at the grade 8 level.

That she received some monetary

awards (ranging from $200 to $700) does not necessarily equate to
what she would have received as compensation had it been a
regular grade 8 assignment.

That is speculative.

But,

considering the grievant's temporary assignments to grade 8 and

her exemplary work on additional assignments, arguably at the
grade 8 level, I think it equitably compelling that a further and
more detailed inquiry be made on the full and detailed nature of
the duties she performed while at grade 7.
I shall direct in my Award that the parties jointly
engaged in such an inquiry on a good faith basis.

I do not have

the authority to order a remedy if the inquiry supports her
contentions.

Rather, if such an inquiry does establish that she

performed duties at the grade 8 level, I would hope and strongly
urge, again, in good faith, that some monetary remedy be
negotiated and agreed to be the parties as compensation for the
grievant.

Of course, if such a joint, good faith inquiry does

not support her contentions, there would be nothing to negotiate.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

The grievance of NANCY DAVENPORT
is arbitrable.

2.

Based on the evidence presented,
the Technical Center did not
violate the collective bargaining
agreement by what it paid Ms.
Davenport for the work she
performed from 1993 to April 25,
1999.

3.

Because of the paucity of the
evidence on the details of the
work performed by Ms. Davenport,
the parties shall conduct a joint
inquiry into the type, details,
extent, responsibilities and
complexity of the regular work

she performed. No remedy is
ordered for any outcome of that
inquiry. But, if the inquiry is
favorable to the grievant, the
Arbitrator recommends the
parties negotiate a mutually
agreeable remedy.
4. Or, this matter may be referred
back to me for further
proceedings if mutually agreed
to by both sides.

Eric J./Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

May 9, 2000

STATE OF NEW YORK

ss :
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

INDUSTRY APPELLATE COMMITTEE

In the Matter of Arbitration Between

PHILADELPHIA MARINE TRADE
ASSOCIATION,
Employer,
Wage Rate Dispute
- and -

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 1291,
Union.

Arbitrator:

Eric J. Schmertz

Appearances:

Gleason & Mat hews, P.C.
(by Ernest L. Mathews, Jr)

for the Union

Klett Lieber Rooney & Schorling
(by Alfred J. D'Angelo, Jr.)

for the Employer

INTRODUCTION
The wage dispute submitted for arbitration arises under two grievances presenting
two different questions. The first question is whether employees who entered the
industry before January 1, 1990, but who did not work enough hours to attain benefit
eligibility during 1990-1996, are to be treated as "new employees" whose wage rate is
governed by paragraph 2(B) of the 1996-2001 Master Container Agreement (Master
Agreement). This first issue affects grievants Alford Hennigan, Belinda Boulware
Collins and, according to the Union, unnamed other similarly situated longshoremen.
The second question, presented by the Collins' grievance, is whether employment in a
port other than Philadelphia qualifies as work in the industry for the purpose of
establishing an employee's wage rate under the Master Agreement when that employee
works in Philadelphia. PMTA treated Collins as a new employee not only because she,
like Hennigan, worked sporadically between 1990 and 1996, but also because she started
work in Philadelphia after October 1, 1996.
A hearing on the grievances was held before the Undersigned in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania on January 24, 2000. The parties were represented at that hearing by
counsel who stipulated certain facts, examined witnesses and introduced documentary
evidence. The arbitrator's oath, if and as applicable, was waived by counsel. There were
no objections to the conduct of the hearing. The parties' counsel thereafter filed written
memoranda.

BACKGROUND FACTS
Grievants* Work History
Alford Hennigan worked as a longshoreman in the Port of Philadelphia in 1986,
1987, 1991, 1994, 1995 and 1998. He worked a total of 745 hours over that period, but
he never qualified for benefits under any collective bargaining agreement.
Belinda Boulware Collins worked as a longshoreman in the Port of Miami in 1989
and 1990 through 1996. She worked a total of 1175 hours over that period, but she, too,
never became eligible for benefits under any agreement. She began working in
Philadelphia after October 1, 1996.
On the effective date of the 1996-2001 Master Agreement, Hennigan and Collins
were each being paid $21.00 per hour straight time when working on Master Agreement
cargo. They received the $2.00 per hour wage increase due on October 1, 1996 under the
Master Agreement, and for two years were paid $23.00 per hour. In September 1998,
however, PMTA reduced their wages to $13.00, the rate for "new employees" pursuant to
its interpretation of paragraph 2(B) of the Master Agreement.
The Master Agreements
The PMTA is a multi-employer association composed of companies operating out
of the ports of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Southern New Jersey; and Wilmington,
Delaware. It is a signatory to the Master Container Agreements covering coastal ports
from Maine to Texas. Signatories to that Agreement include the Carriers Container
Council, Inc., different Port Associations (including PMTA), stevedoring companies, and
the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA). The Master Agreements establish

the wage rates for longshoremen when loading or unloading vessels carrying containers.
PMTA is also a signatory to local agreements with various ILA locals, including Local
1291. The local agreements establish the wages for longshoremen when loading or
unloading noncontainer or break bulk cargo and they govern local issues such as benefits,
hiring times, and seniority. The local wage agreements specify that "new employees"
will be those as defined in the Master Agreement.l
In response to increasing competition from companies without ILA contracts, the
1986-89 Master Agreement created two wage tiers as follows:
WAGES
A. Containerization, LASH and Break-Bulk Cargo
1st year - $17.00 per hour straight time rate
2nd year - $17.00 per hour straight time rate
3rd year - $18.00 per hour straight time rate
B. New Employees
Employees entering the industry and employed under this
collective bargaining agreement for the first time after
October 1, 1986 (never having been employed or registered in
the industry in any year prior thereto) shall be deemed new
employees who shall receive $14.00 per hour straight time
rate for the first two years of this Agreement, and $15.00 per
hour in the third year of this Agreement.
(other language omitted as irrelevant)
The higher wage tier under the 1986-89 Master Agreement consisted of employees who
first entered the industry on or before October 1, 1986. The lower wage tier in that
Agreement consisted of those who first entered the industry after October 1, 1986. The
1 Hennigan was paid at the rate for a new employee when he handled general cargo under the local agreement. The
Master Agreement is dispositive of his grievance because the local agreement uses the Master Agreement's
definition of "new employees."

line dividing the two tiers was first entry to the industry by specific date. The differential
between the top pay in the two tiers was $3.00 per hour straight time.
The 1990-94 Master Agreement, that was extended by agreement through
September 30, 1996, added a third wage tier. That wage agreement was as follows:
WAGES
1st year -

December 1, 1990 to September 30, 1991
$19.00 per hour straight time rate

2 nd year-- October 1, 1991 to September 30, 1992
$20.00 per hour straight time rate
3rd year - October 1, 1992 to September 30, 1993
$21.00 per hour straight time rate
4th year - October 1, 1993 to September 30, 1994
$22.00 per hour straight time rate
Employees who entered the industry on or after October 1,
1986 and who are presently receiving wage rates below
$18.00 per hour straight time rate shall be given a wage
increase to $18.00 per hour straight time rate on December 1,
1990; $1.00 per hour straight time rate on October 1, 1991;
$1.00 per hour straight time rate on October 1, 1992 and
$1.00 per hour straight time rate on October 1, 1993 for a
total of $21.00 per hour straight time rate.
Employees entering the industry and employed under this
Collective Bargaining Agreement for the first time as of
December 1, 1990 (never having been employed or registered
in the industry in any year prior thereto) shall be deemed new
employees who shall receive $15.00 straight time per hour
after December 1, 1990.
Under the 1990-96 Master Agreement, the highest wages again applied to persons
who first entered the industry before October 1, 1986. The middle tier under the 1990-96
Master Agreement, which had been the second of the two tiers under the 1986-89 Master
Agreement, were those employees who first entered the industry on and after October 1,

1986 and before December 1, 1990. This group was to receive $21.00 per hour by the
end of the 1990-96 Master Agreement The $3.00 differential that had existed between
those tiers under the 1986-89 Master Agreement was thus reduced over the term of the
1990-96 Master Agreement to $1.00.
The new, third tier created by the 1990-96 Master Agreement covered employees
entering the industry for the first time as of December 1, 1990 and after. They were to be
paid $15.00 per hour without any scheduled increases for the duration of the 1990-96
Master Agreement.
The 1990-96 Master Agreement, like the prior Master Agreement, again defined
all tiers by reference to an employee's entry into the industry.
The 1996-2001 Master Agreement continued three wage tiers as follows:
WAGES
(A) During the term of the Agreement, there will be wage
increases for all employees employed in containerization and
ro-ro who on the effective date of the Agreement were being
paid $21.00 an hour.
October
October
October
October
October

1, 1996
1, 1997
1, 1998
1, 1999
1, 2000

- $2.00 an hour
- 0
- $1.00 an hour
- 0
- $1.00 an hour

(B) New employees who enter the industry on or after
October 1, 1996 (never having attained benefit eligibility
under the terms of the present Master Agreement) shall
receive $13.00 an hour, plus an increase of $1.00 per hour in
each of the third and fifth years of the agreement.
(C) Employees who entered the industry and were employed
under this Agreement for the first time on or after January 1,
1990, shall be entitled to continue to receive their basic rate

as of the effective date of this Agreement plus the increases
described in Section A above.
(remainder omitted as irrelevant)
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
Union
Employees, like the two named grievants, who were making at least $21.00 per
hour on the effective date of the 1996-2001 Master Agreement, are covered under 2(A) of
that Agreement. Paragraph 2(B) applies only to employees who enter the industry on and
after October 1, 1996. The parenthetical in paragraph 2(B) is not applicable to persons
who entered the industry before October 1, 1996, even if they have not attained benefit
eligibility. The parenthetical statement in 2(B) referring to benefit eligibility is
meaningless surplusege that was disregarded by PMTA for two years. Service in the
industry is transferable port to port for wage rate purposes under the Master Agreement.
Employer
The 1996-2001 Master Agreement materially changed the format and definitions
of the wage tiers under the two prior Master Agreements by adding benefit eligibility as a
condition to certain employees remaining in the top tier. The lowest wage rate in 2(B) of
the Master Agreement applies to two classes of employees. One group consists of
employees who first entered the industry on and after October 1, 1996. The other
consists of those employees who were employed in the industry before January 1, 1990,
but who did not attain benefit eligibility by working 700 hours in any one year between
1990 and 1996. Effect must be given to the parenthetical in paragraph 2(B). The effect

of that parenthetical is to treat those employees who "wandered" through the industry
working only sporadically before 1990 as "new employees" for wage rate purposes on
and after October 1, 1996. Service is not transferable port to port for wage rate purposes.
OPINION
Tier Placement
The top tier in paragraph 2(A) of the 1996-2001 Agreement is defined by
reference to an employee's hourly wage rate as of the start of the 1996-2001 Master
Agreement. Of the three tiers, the top tier in 2(A) is without any ambiguity. "All
employees" who were making at least $21.00 per hour on the effective date of the 19962001 Master Agreement fall in the top tier in 2(A). Like the Master Agreements before
it, the top tier of the 1996-2001 Master Agreement includes the employees who entered
the industry before October 1, 1986 and who were making $22.00 per hour on the
effective date of the 1996-2001 Master Agreement. The top tier also includes those
employees who first entered the industry on and after October 1, 1986, and before
December 1, 1990, who were making $21.00 per hour.2 Thus, the touchstone of 2(A) is
still, like the wage agreements before it, the employee's entry date into the industry. That
entry date, in turn, establishes the wage rate that pertains to the grievants and others like
them. Grievants Hennigan and Collins were each making $21.00 per hour on the
effective date of the 1996-2001 Master Agreement when handling Master Agreement
cargo because they entered the industry early enough to be making those rates.

The wage rate of those who entered the industry between January and December 1, 1990 is also grandfathered
under 2(C).

2

Therefore, by the plain terms of paragraph 2(A) they, and others with similar longevity in
the industry, are top tier employees.
The Employer argues, however, that notwithstanding 2(A), all employees who
first entered the industry before January 1, 1990 are to be treated as "new employees"
under 2(B) if they did not work 700 hoursJ in at least one year between January 1,1990
and October 1, 1996. The Employer would attach the parenthetical in 2(B) to 2(A) and
thereby cause the employees who otherwise fall in 2(A) to move to 2(B). On the
Employer's argument, "old" employees become "new" employees on and after October
1, 1996 unless they have attained benefit eligibility. The Employer's argument must be
rejected for several reasons.
First, the Employer's argument necessitates that the word "all" in paragraph 2(A)
be read to mean only "some." I do not believe it reasonable to conclude that the
sophisticated parties who negotiated the 1996-2001 Master Agreement did not understand
the common meaning of the word "all" (everyone of a group), particularly when they
then defined the top tier by reference only to the wage rate then being earned by "all" of
those employees. Nor is it reasonable to believe that the negotiators were incapable of
expressing a qualification or an exception to language that is unqualified if that had been
their intent. That would have been a simple exercise in contract drafting.
Second, the Employer's argument requires that many of the employees who are in
the top wage tier in 2(A) by virtue of their longevity in the industry are to be moved out
of that tier and down into the lowest tier in 2(B). There is nothing persuasive in this
That is the number of hours required to qualify for fringe benefits under the local agreement.

record, however, to support a conclusion that employees who are in one tier under the
language of that tier are to be moved down and out of that tier by virtue of language
found only in a different tier. Indeed, the Employer's argument regarding movement of
employees from tier 2(A) to 2(B) is not consistent with the treatment afforded employees
who are in middle tier 2(C). Paragraph 2(C) covers persons who entered the industry
between January 1, 1990 and before October 1, 1996. These were employees who were
making more than $13.00. The parties agree that these employees maintain their higher
rates under the 1996-2001 Master Agreement and are granted the increases in paragraph
2(A), even if they had not attained benefit eligibility between 1990 and 1996. In other
words, employees in middle tier 2(C) were not to be moved to lowest tier 2(B) no matter
how little they may have worked. It is not reasonable to conclude that persons in the
highest paid tier of 2(A), most, if not all, of whom had longer service in the industry than
those in tier 2(C), would be affected by the parenthetical in tier 2(B) when those in tier
2(C) were not affected by it. If 2(B) is inapplicable to 2(C), then it is not reasonable,
without specific evidence of such intent, to conclude that 2(B) restrains and qualifies the
operation of 2(A), which is more clearly and cleanly written than 2(C).
The Employer argues, however, that employees in 2(C) had their wage rates
"grandfathered" to reward their dedication to the industry or to induce them to "become
dedicated longshoremen." This argument also lacks merit.
First, there is simply no persuasive evidence of that intent. Moreover, employees
in 2(C), just like those in 2(A), also would not have attained benefit eligibility between
1990 and October 1, 1996. Those 2(C) employees may have worked just as
10

"sporadically" between 1990 to 1996 as did the employees who entered the industry
before 1990, yet the 2(C) employees had their wages of $15.00 or more protected against
reduction. That being so, it is not reasonable to conclude that the parties agreed to take
employees who were then making at least $21.00 per hour and reduce them to $13.00 per
hour when persons who entered the industry at a later date, and were making less money,
had their wage rates maintained and increased under paragraph 2(A) regardless of how
few hours they may have worked.
In addition, and as the Union points out, the Employer's argument, if accepted,
would produce an unreasonable result. An employee hired before January 1, 1990 who
worked, for example, 690 hours for many years but who never reached 700 hours in any
one year between 1990 and 1996 would be paid $13.00 per hour, the same rate as is paid
to a new entrant, despite thousands of hours of service, while those hired between 1990
and October 1, 1996 could work very little or not at all and still have their higher wage
rates protected and increased. This is an illogical result to be avoided in the interpretation
of the Master Agreement unless the record evidence were to require such an
interpretation and it does not.
Third, the Employer's decision to reduce the employee's wage rate to $13.00 was
plainly an afterthought. For two years after the 1996-2001 Master Agreement became
effective, the Employer paid the grievants and others like them the tier 2(A) wage rate. I
do not regard this as a binding, extra-contractual practice, but that action,
contemporaneous with the negotiation of the Master Agreement, evidences the parties'
intent regarding tier placement.
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Fourth, the Employer, despite opportunity, introduced no evidence of negotiating
history concerning the wage provisions of the 1996-2001 Master Agreement. Rather, it
attempted to buttress the reasonableness of its interpretation of the wage provision of the
Master Agreement by offering some evidence of the economic problems besetting the
industry generally and the Philadelphia/Wilmington ports particularly. This included
competition form non-ILA companies and a substantial decline in total hours worked.
Although concessions were made by the ILA and its locals during negotiations,
apparently starting as early as the 1986-89 Master Agreement, there is simply nothing in
this record to establish that among those concessions was an agreement to take
employees who were earning the highest rate of pay by virtue of their length of service in
the industry and reduce them to the lowest contractual rate of pay because they worked
only sporadically. There is no persuasive evidence of the Master Agreement being
structured to respond to what the Employer characterizes as industry "wanderers" or
"casuals."
The Employer's argument is no more persuasive to the extent it relies upon the
particular economic conditions affecting the PMTA members who operate out of the
ports in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Southern New Jersey and Wilmington, Delaware.
The Master Agreement sets the wage rates for all ports from Maine to Texas for
longshoremen when loading or unloading vessels carrying containers. It is not
reasonable to conclude that those master rates were fixed just to benefit PMTA members
when there are many other employers subject to that Master Agreement, even if PMTA
members use casuals to a greater extent and more often than other employers.
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The Employer argues, however, that the parenthetical language in 2(B) must mean
something and that I am powerless to nullify that contractual provision. But to give the
language in 2(B) the interpretation the Employer wants would nullify paragraph 2(A) in
major respect. Persons who fall in tier 2(A) because they were earning $21.00 per hour
on the effective date of the 1996-2001 Master Agreement would be removed from 2(A)
and placed in 2(B) unless they also attained benefit eligibility between 1990 and 1996.
Yet there are no conditions, qualifications, restrictions, or exceptions to initial and
continuing placement in 2(A), other than an employee having obtained a particular wage
rate as of a particular date.
Paragraph 2(B) begins quite clearly by defining "new employees" as those "who
enter the industry on and after October 1, 1996." It then adds a parenthetical after that
reference and before the wage rate. The Employer claims that the language in parenthesis
is not a merely further description of the employees who entered on or after October 1,
1996, even though that was the purpose of the parenthetical references in the prior Master
Agreements. Rather, it is alleged that the language in parenthesis adds an entirely
different class of "new employees." This different class, according to the Employer,
consists of the employees who began working in the industry before January 1, 1990, but
who did not work 700 hours in a year between January 1, 1990 and October 1, 1996. I
cannot accept that the parenthetical added a group of employees to 2(B) that is entirely
different from the one class of employees that is clearly covered by that paragraph.
The Employer's argument is further burdened by the reference in the 2(B)
parenthetical to one having attained benefit eligibility under the "Master Agreement."
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The Master Agreements do not establish benefit eligibility. The local agreements control
benefit eligibility. Therefore, it is at least inaccurate to speak of attaining benefit
eligibility under any Master Agreement, whether previous or current.
In the final analysis, paragraph 2(A) is clear and unambiguous in its terms and
paragraph 2(B) is not. Whatever the meaning, if any, of the parenthetical in 2(B), which
was part of a draft proposal made by the employer parties to the Master Agreement, 2(B)
cannot override the clear language that precedes it in 2(A). The language in 2(B) may
not be meaningless, as the Union would have me conclude, but neither can I give 2(B) the
meaning the Employer ascribes to it when the effect would be contrary to the clear and
simple language in 2 (A). The overall effect of the Employer's argument is to make
unclear the only tier that by its terms is clear. The argument, thus, strains normal and
accepted methods of contract interpretation and it must be rejected.
Portability of Service
Grievant Collins did not begin working in Philadelphia until after October 1, 1996.
This would make her clearly a new employee falling within paragraph 2(B) of the Master
Agreement unless her work in the port of Miami, which began in 1989, counts as work in
the industry.
The Employer claims that service in one port covered by the Master Agreement,
regardless of the duration of that service and the number of hours actually worked by the
employee, is irrelevant for wage rate purposes when an employee begins work in another
port covered by the Master Agreement. According to the Employer, such an employee is
to be treated as a new employee and is to be paid the lowest wage under 2(B) no matter
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how long the employee may have worked in the industry. With each and every move to a
new port, an employee begins at the lowest wage rate every time. I again cannot agree
with this proposed interpretation of the Master Agreement for a number of reasons.
First, portability of service in the industry for purposes of establishing the wage
rate to be paid for work with Master Agreement cargo is essential to and inherent in the
concept of a master wage agreement. That agreement establishes uniform terms on
certain core issues, like wages, coast wide. Thus, 2(A) applies to "all employees
employed in containerization and ro-ro." That is an industry standard. Nothing in that
Master Agreement suggests that wage rates are tied to a particular port. It cannot
reasonably be concluded, absent compelling evidence of that intent, that these parties
agreed to substantially reduce the pay of a senior, experienced employee to the entry
level wage rate paid to a novice simply because that employee moves from one port
covered by the Master Agreement to another port covered by that same agreement. The
Master Agreement does not specifically allow portability of service for wage purposes,
but neither does it prohibit it. Silence is not synonymous with prohibition. No specific
statement of agreement to portability of service for wage purposes is necessary in the
Master Agreement when it is inherent in the Master Agreement itself. It is, therefore,
inconsequential that the Union did not offer any witnesses to testify to the existence of
portability of service for purposes of establishing the wage rates for employees when
working with Master Agreement cargo. It was necessary for the Employer to prove that
portability of service for wage purposes does not exist under the Master Agreement.
Ultimately, I conclude that it did not carry that burden.
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Second, the Master Agreement wage rates, like many of its other terms, are not
specific to particular ports, but to the "industry." The Master Agreement refers
repeatedly to the word "industry" and it refers to local ports when a limitation is intended.
Had these parties intended to create something other than an industry wage rate, they
would have and should have said so in their agreement. As the Union argues, a contract
covering the wages in many ports cannot be restricted to a single port without clear
manifestation of that intent, and that is not present on this record. The one sentence of
testimony that the "industry" means a particular port even as to wage rates cannot be
deemed dispositive of the parties' intent when to credit that testimony fully would negate
the very purpose of a master wage agreement.
Third, that there is no portability of service for certain purposes does not mean
there is no portability of service for wage purposes. Certain issues, such as seniority, are
governed at the local level. Wage portability will not affect local control of those local
issues, despite the Employer's articulated concerns. A longshoreman who leaves one
port and goes to a new port may have the lowest seniority and, thus, may not often work
until that employee builds seniority in the local port. But whenever that employee does
work, the service in the industry establishes that employee's wage rate. The general
testimony from other employer representatives which failed to differentiate Master
Agreement issues and local issues is not persuasive of a contrary conclusion.
The Employer argues also that the Hampton Roads Port Association twice denied
employees portability and, therefore, there must be none under the Master Agreement.
The incidents, however, are not persuasive of the meaning of the Master Agreement.
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These were local actions, one of which was not grieved and both of which were unclear
in their particulars. The other local decision was grieved, but that grievance was settled
at a low level on terms that are not revealed on the record. These incidents cannot
reasonably evidence the intent of the persons who negotiated the Master Agreement
regarding portability of service for wage rate purposes.
Similarly, that two Local 1291 officials may have agreed for a time with the
Employer's treatment of Collins is inconsequential. Local 1291, upon further reflection,
decided to pursue the grievance on her behalf.
The reciprocal agreement between the South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District,
ELA, the New Orleans Steamship Association, the West Gulf Maritime Association and
other management port associations allowed a large group of employees to temporarily
transfer from Texas to New Orleans to work bagged cargo without losing their benefit
eligibility in their home port. As the Union argues, that reciprocal agreement sheds little,
if any, light on the intent of the drafters of the Master Agreement regarding portability of
service for wage rate purposes when employees handle Master Agreement cargo.
As with the analysis of an employee's tier status, in the end, the Employer could
prevail on its "no portability" argument only if there had been substantial evidence of that
intent because its interpretation is so completely inconsistent with the purposes served by
the parties' Master Agreements. That evidence is lacking on this record and what little
evidence there is in this regard is not persuasive of the conclusion the Employer would
have me reach. Portability of service for wage rate purposes is inherent in the Master
Agreement and nothing in that agreement or the local agreements disqualifies an
17

employee, who relocates from one port to another, from receipt of the wages owed that
employee under paragraph 2(A) of the Master Agreement.
Having found that the grievances must be sustained on the language of the 19962001 Master Agreement, I need not consider the parties' arguments regarding a grievance
involving the Port of Hampton Roads, Virginia and the Hampton Roads Shipping
Association.
AWARD
The grievances are sustained. The named grievants are not "new employees" for
purposes of wage rate calculation under either the Master Agreement or local agreements,
and they need not have attained benefit eligibility between January 1, 1990 and October
1, 1996 to avoid classification as new employees on and after October 1, 1996.
The Employer is ordered to pay the grievants the wages established by paragraph
2(A) of the 1996-2001 Master Agreement when handling Master Agreement cargo and
the corresponding wage rates established by local agreements for other than new
employees when they handle other cargo. The application of this award to other
employees similarly situated is left to the parties for implementation. I retain jurisdiction
to resolve any dispute over the application and/or the interpretation of this award.

Dated:

.
/
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/Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

State of New York

)
)ss:
County of New York )
I hereby affirm pursuant to CPLR 7507 that I am the individual described herein
and who executed this instrument which is my Award.

Dated:
ric J. Schmertz
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